The New REPUBLIC

July 1, 1940

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A Special Section on

A National Policy for Defense

with these contributors

Fletcher Pratt — Fritz Sternberg

C. Hartley Grattan — Max Lerner

George Soule — Jonathan Mitchell

Bruce Bliven — Howard J. Trueblood

Wilson Answers MacLeish

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

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Defense Now

Our supplement on national defense included with this issue is not, as its readers will see, a technical discussion of modern weapons or military strategy. It concentrates rather on *policy* for defense, since strategy must grow out of national policy. The writers clearly indicate that the most important immediate task of defense is to devote every possible effort to prevent the defeat of Great Britain. Put in the lowest and baldest terms, it may be said that the conquest of France and the loss of her navy has already cost us $4,000,000,000, since that is the size of the additional authorization sought by our naval authorities and accepted by Congress when it became apparent that France was lost. A Hitler conquest of Britain would immensely aggravate our defense problem, even if we ignore all intangible considerations, such as the effect on our morale.

At this moment we discover that a 1917 law prevents us from allowing the sale to Britain of twenty torpedo boats just built for our navy. This is not of crucial importance in itself, but it stops further naval aid short of war. And Senator David Walsh of Massachusetts, chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, protests at any help to the Allies, though the obvious need is for Congress to facilitate such protection to this country. We have seen similar action by statesmen in other nations, with names as familiar as Schuschnigg, Bonnet, Chamberlain.

Pétain Capitulates

The armistice terms imposed by Germany and signed by Marshal Pétain's government constitute not only complete subjection but, what is almost as significant, acceptance of subjection by Bordeaux. Their details are unimportant, since everything is included that could not only deprive France of any future power of resistance, but also make her a passive ally in the forthcoming war to destroy Britain. The government itself will have to accept any policies the Axis wishes to impose, and there are some indications in recent dispatches from Bordeaux that it will not only accept them but actively coöperate, at least in economic affairs.

Only one clause in the armistice terms bears the appearance of a self-denying ordinance—though Germany demands the surrender of the French fleet, she promises not to use it against Britain. But she could not do so in any case for many months, unless French sailors would consent to do the fighting, since it takes a long time to train crews for the mechanical intricacies of modern warships. Even if sufficient German sailors were available they would not know the special French devices. And in any case, Hitler has the power to alter the terms to suit himself without French consent.

Nothing is said of final peace terms. If Britain is conquered, Hitler and Mussolini can dictate these as well. The only possibility of restoring French independence and power would be a British victory, which the Pétain government has promised to help Hitler

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prevent. If this is not a dishonorable peace, we never heard of one.

People and Government

It is important, in discussing these events, to distinguish between the French people and the Bordeaux government. The armistice terms have not been published in France—or in Germany, for that matter—and the French people would have known nothing of them if they had not been obtained, with great difficulty, by the British Ambassador, and broadcast from London. The citizens of the Republic have had no chance to register their will. There is no question that the army was hopelessly defeated, that it had negligible aid at the crucial moment from Britain, and that this country could respond to the French appeal with little but promises. Neither the people nor the army had any reasonable choice but to lay down their arms, within the limits where the power of Germany extended. But, as British sources pointed out, they could have done so without a formal signature of terms by their government, as the Norwegians, the Dutch and the Belgians did. In that way they would have saved their merchant marine, their navy, their armed forces outside of France and the economic power of their colonial empire, not only to help their ally and fulfill their pledge not to make a separate peace, but to do whatever was possible to save France from future slavery.

General De Gaulle in London, a brilliant and aggressive officer, has taken this view and is attempting to rally a committee of prominent Frenchmen to save what is possible. It is yet uncertain whether he can succeed in the face of the Pétain brand of leadership, which has disowned him and threatens him with court-martial. If it be argued that this action by Bordeaux does not represent its true sentiments but is the only possible one for a resident French government, that fact alone is sufficient indication of the vassalage which the Pétain policy has accepted.

The End of the Third Republic

Many are seeking the explanation of the action of Pétain and his associates in giving their own nation the *coup de grâce*. It was not necessary in order to stop a useless slaughter. They may have hoped that they could render the present plight of the people less intolerable, fearing the extremes to which Hitler would go if they did not give assent. But it is inevitable that the reason should be sought in the fact that they are, almost without exception, conservative in politics and Catholic in religion.

In general this government is representative of those who wanted to appease Hitler in the beginning; those who sabotaged social reform under the People's Front government by sabotaging industrial production, and so weakened the power to rearm; those who fought aggressive tactics and alert command in the army; those who are opposed to liberalism, democracy and whatever survives of the French revolution. Their rule in France is playing the same role as the ascendancy of Schuschnigg in Austria once did. They are not precisely pro-Hitler; their ideal is probably a kind of Catholic corporative state; but the result of their action has been and continues to be a betrayal of their country to its most formidable enemy. We shall not have to look far to find their American counterparts.

The Betrayal of the Exiles

One of the most dishonorable terms of the dishonorable armistice is the agreement to turn over to Hitler, on demand, any German subjects who are now in France. This means, of course, the refugees—Jews and non-Jewish political opponents who have sacrificed nearly all in their battle against tyranny and consequently are sought by the Gestapo. The Daladier government put them into concentration camps; so far as we know, few of them were released by Reynaud; and now Pétain promises to round them up and deliver them to death or torture. They would have faced a tragic situation in any event, but they would have had a better chance to escape without the opposition of the French government. They include about 120 prominent German and Austrian writers, such as Heinrich Mann, Lion Feuchtwanger, Franz Werfel. And what about the Czechs, the Poles, the Italians and Spaniards? If this government can do anything by forceful recommendations and provision of asylum for these gallant political exiles, it should not lose a moment in doing so. Himmler is already busy.

Knox and Stimson at Bat

Why did President Roosevelt invite Colonel Knox and Colonel Stimson into his Cabinet? No doubt, as is common in his adroit and subtle mind, there were several reasons. (1) He wanted to replace Mr. Woodring, who was opposed to the utmost aid to Great Britain, with a strong interventionist such as Mr. Stimson was known to be. (2) In Colonel Knox he had another strong interventionist. (3) He probably also possessed a mischievous desire to steal the thunder of the Republicans on the eve of their convention. (4) A coalition cabinet is an argument to the country for keeping the Democrats in power. (5) By going outside his own party he impressed on the public the gravity of the national crisis.

The question not answered by the foregoing explanation is whether Knox and Stimson are the best possible men for these vitally important posts. Mr. Stimson is an outstanding citizen, of demonstrated great abilities; he is a man of imagination and vigor, though he may be somewhat handicapped by his age, which is seventy-three, and the fact that his last direct contact with the War Department was twenty-eight years ago. Colonel Knox is a hustling business man who saw mili-

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tary service in 1898 and in 1918. If he has ever had any contact with the navy, Who's Who does not record it. These two appointments are certainly better than the choice of two routine Democratic politicians would have been. Whether they were the best possible selections in a national emergency, only time can say.

Same Old Party

The first few days of the Republican Convention were not a spectacle to make an independent onlooker throw up his hat and cheer. The young progressives of whom we have heard so much were not in evidence; what we saw were a job lot of old-line politicians who wanted to win the election by any tactics, however sordid or dirty, because they wished to get back within reach of the federal moneybags. They showed no real conception of the terrible changes that are sweeping over the world, of the dangers to the United States or what must be done to meet those dangers. They had no clear-cut ideas on any subject, or if they had, they were prepared to abandon them for the sake of expediency.

The great stampede toward Mr. Wendell Willkie seemed to be based on nothing but the grimly realistic idea that he could get more votes than Mr. Taft or the youthful Mr. Dewey. The foreign-policy plank was a compromise between isolationist and interventionist views which added up to just about nothing. The domestic planks seemed likely to say "the Roosevelt policies are pretty good but the Republicans ought to be in office to administer them," or to paraphrase Mr. Edmund Wilson, "let's take the New Deal away from the New Dealers." There is nothing novel in all this; Republican politicians have been shortsighted, mercenary and lacking in conviction on many previous occasions. Nevertheless we must record a sense of shock and disturbance that the national emergency has affected them so little. If they reflect the mood of the country, the task of arming ourselves adequately and in time is going to be harder than we had thought.

Cross-Eyed Warrior

John L. Lewis' bungling attempt to bargain with the Republicans will not help labor's political power, though it weakens the CIO, helps further to divide labor, and is dangerous to the safety of the nation at this critical period. If he had a realistic sense of politics, he would know that the Republicans haven't a ghost of a chance in the coming election, unless they can work up a big scare on foreign policy that will divide the people in the face of their foreign enemies and hasten the defeat of Hitler's last remaining adversary—before our own turn comes to fight alone. Lewis' kind words for Hoover are, as a political gesture, about the most inept that could be imagined, even if what he said were true—as it is not. Hoover policies did much to bring on the depression, and almost nothing to remedy it. The New Deal has its own grave faults, of course, but its troubles are in great part due to conservative opposition. Lewis is always a good fighter, but sometimes singularly obtuse in picking out the enemy.

Blaming It on Labor

A good many people now have a simple and easy explanation of why France lost her war. It is that during the period of the Popular Front, French labor refused to work hard enough to arm the country. Therefore, the moral runs, if we want to be safe, we must smash the labor unions and stop all this nonsense about collective bargaining, the shortened work week and so on. It is no coincidence that the people who talk this way were against trade unions long before the French collapsed. They have merely found a new excuse for an old prejudice. The Blum government may have been derelict in failing to appreciate the size and character of the German threat. But so were the conservative governments which preceded and followed the Popular Front. The manufacturers themselves did a great deal to sabotage French rearmament, in the course of their fight against French labor. And what about England's equally shocking failure to rearm during nine years of rule by the Tories? It is an extremely serious matter that so many people should seize our national crisis merely as an excuse to try to stab labor in the back.

Let in the Refugees

Mr. Roosevelt, most of Congress and nearly all of the American public profess deep sympathy with Great Britain. Up to now, however, we have refused to give that sympathy the first, most obvious and most desperately needed expression. Hitler's full attack on the British Isles is likely to begin within a few days or weeks. There are huge numbers of civilians, and especially children, who ought not to be subjected to this horror. Yet we have done nothing to modify the immigration quotas when that is necessary, or to cut the red tape when it is not. We have done nothing to provide the needed transportation. We have done nothing, except by a little hit-or-miss private charity, to provide the funds that are required. If Britain is defeated during the next few weeks, quite possibly when our grandchildren ask, many years hence, "What did the United States do during the Hitler war?" the answer will be, "The United States helped arrange to have as many children as possible bombed to death from the sky."

News Notes of a Week

An unconfirmed rumor came from Budapest that the Soviet Union had invaded Bessarabia, a formerly Russian province of what is now fascist Rumania. . . . The French and British consulates in Chungking were demolished by Japanese bombers. . . . The Red Army banned "pseudo-democracy" and familiarity between officers and men. . . . Spanish Republican refugees in

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France were refused entry into Spain and border officials intimated that they were no longer considered Spanish. Many Spanish and International Brigade soldiers were reported still imprisoned in France.

The Michigan Secretary of State, Harry F. Kelly, made a blacklist of the 9,000 signatures that placed the Communist Party on the ballot in Michigan. His action was condemned by the Civil Rights Federation and other liberal groups. . . . The White House received several hundred letters and telegrams proposing that the United States take over the French navy as payment on the war debt. . . . After an hour's conference with President Roosevelt, Mayor LaGuardia denied rumors that he might be appointed Secretary of Labor to succeed Frances Perkins, but said that "in case of an emergency, of course, anyone goes anywhere." . . . The United States district court in Brooklyn acquitted nine of the thirteen Christian Front members accused of conspiracy to overthrow the government and declared a mistrial in the case of the other four. . . . David Lasser resigned as national president of the Workers' Alliance, saying it was dominated by an un-named political party. The administrative committee of the Alliance, which accepted the resignation unanimously, explained that Lasser meant the Communist Party, said that it was not true, and claimed that Lasser had "succumbed to the war drive of the Roosevelt administration." . . . Police Commissioner Valentine warned New York police to guard the city's manholes and sewer systems against fifth columnists.

Universal Military Service

IT IS ACKNOWLEDGED by almost everybody that the only efficient way to raise a great army for modern war is by compulsory universal service. Every nation confronted with this task has used this means, whether the government concerned be autocratic, democratic or somewhere between. Even Britain and her chief dominions, with the exception of Canada, have installed conscription before or during the present war, although the British tradition places a higher value on individual liberty than any other in the modern world. (Canada is a special case, because of her French Canadian population, whose loyalty either to the Empire or to Republican France is dubious, to say the least.) The primary reason for universal service, whatever else may be said for it, is dire necessity. The ultimate test of victory is manpower; nothing less than the military effort of a whole population will suffice. Campaigns for volunteers are too slow and uncertain in recruiting the necessary numbers.

Volunteering suffers two additional disadvantages which alone would be enough to send it into the discard. First, an army must receive long and intensive training before it is called upon to fight efficiently in the modern manner, and it is impossible to stir up enough interest in a recruiting campaign while a nation is still at peace, though that is the time when the training should be given. Second, there is much more in proper war organization than getting the necessary number of men under arms. It is getting the right men in the right places, and refraining from putting uniforms on the men who would be more valuable in the equally important functions of industry and transport behind the lines. In order to mobilize a nation it is necessary to put through the sieve the whole generation of fighting age, so that there may be sifted into separate compartments those who ought to stick at their jobs, those who are unfit for service, and those who are better fitted for special duties than for the front line. Universal service is the only possible means of putting system and order into a military machine of ambitious size.

Just as The New Republic endorsed universal service during the last war, it would unhesitatingly advocate universal military training in the present effort at building up the national defense, the moment it became clear that a large army might be needed. It would do so first of all for the reasons of military necessity explained above, since if a democracy must fight, it is folly for a democracy not to put every ounce of its strength into the struggle.

But there are additional reasons of a political nature, which seem to us compelling. First is the danger to free institutions of a large professional standing army. The way to safeguard liberty against the worst abuses of militarism, if one must go in for militarization, is by way of a citizen army. Civilians temporarily in uniform cannot be treated as the minions of an officer caste, provided the civilians are at the same time citizens of a democracy. Since they include all shades of persuasion and all groups in the community, it is hard to weld them into a political movement serving minority interests. And, if worst comes to worst, democracy is safer when everyone knows how to shoot than when only a professional minority knows.

Still another good reason is that the sense of solidarity and equality of sacrifice which a nation in peril requires is furthered by the knowledge that in the matter of military responsibility all are equal. Finally, the fact that individual citizens are being conscripted to fight makes it easier to enforce on industry and property the rationalization, the restrictions of price and profit and the high taxation which are indispensable. Indeed, universal service stiffens the pressure on everyone behind the lines and makes war profiteering such a

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source of moral weakness as to compel the most strenuous measures against it. If universal service were in force, any candidate who proposed to fight a war with good old "business as usual" would be more unpopular than a fifth columnist.

The question now before the United States, however, is a peculiarly difficult one, because it is still a question how large an army we shall want and how soon we ought to try to get it into shape. If what we need is what is at present authorized—a highly skilled and mechanized force of something less than a half-million men, it is not too large to be raised by ordinary recruiting methods from our great population, and it is scarcely large enough to be a danger to our institutions. To put every young man through intensive military training when we expect to utilize only four or five percent of those between twenty and twenty-four (who number above 10,000,000) would be excessively wasteful. Even an army of a million or a million and a half would scarcely seem to warrant universal training, though it might justify selecting those for training through the method of universal registration. And no wildest estimate holds that we shall need a force larger than this, or could equip it soon if we did—unless, indeed, we are preparing to challenge Hitler on the other side of the Atlantic and the Mikado on the Yangtze.

A second consideration is that for the moment our front line is being held by Great Britain. It would be poor economy indeed to take from that line such pitifully inadequate munitions and supplies as we are now able to send it in order to begin training and equipping an army that could not possibly get into action for two years, or one that is larger than we are likely to have to employ. It is well known that when we entered the last war and began to form a big army, the Allies received almost no arms from us for the duration of the war, but on the contrary had to supply a large part of the weapons for those of our soldiers who saw action. Until those now engaged against Hitler need men more than munitions, it is the worst of strategy to devote our still unmobilized industry to anything but the supply of weapons for them. Already our army authorities have severely hampered "aid short of war" by emphasis on purely nationalistic defense, need for which is not likely to arise if Britain is not defeated. We should be ready to move quickly to training as soon as strategic economy permits, but not too soon. It is a matter of timing, and of the speed of industrial mobilization, and of the capacity of the British to hold firm.

With these considerations in mind, it seems to us that the Burke bill for universal training now in Congress is ill adapted to the situation. It is almost a carbon copy of the measure used in the last war; it is unnecessary for anything except the task of raising and training a military force of millions; it contains no hint that its authors have anything like a realistic view of the present world or of the needs of this country.

Though no administration measure has been presented as we write, we like much better the hints thrown out by the President as to the sort of thing he would favor. It would apply, not to the whole population, but to young men only—and possibly young women as well. It would recognize that only a small part of those registered would be required for strictly military service. It would provide useful things for the others to do—and our relatively small experience with the CCC and the WPA shows that there is plenty of non-military work which must be done if the nation is to become sound and strong. It would explicitly be administered in view of the fact that one of the main functions of an institution of this kind is to nurture the interest of democracy in common service of the community. And it would express the truth that a large part of our job is not just to teach men to fight, but to teach them to work together for all tasks required by a democratic state, whether destructive or constructive.

War and the New Generation

IF AMERICANS of the new generation have lost their faith in moral principles, who is to blame? The argument over this question, begun three weeks ago by Archibald MacLeish, is now continued by Edmund Wilson. It seems to us that his defense of the post-war writers—see page 30 of the present issue—is logically unassailable. If anything could have restored faith in what MacLeish calls "the Word," it was their painful honesty. But it also seems to us that Wilson overlooked something in his otherwise complete reply. He failed to say that MacLeish, too, was writing with painful honesty about a situation that everyone knows to exist.

During the past few months it has become apparent that there is an intellectual gulf between two generations, the post-war and the pre-war. It can be seen almost everywhere, but is especially obvious in the Eastern colleges, where the majority of each faculty is already fighting Hitler, while a considerable part of the student body is against military intervention and lukewarm about aiding the Allies. That is the case at Yale, Princeton and Dartmouth, to judge by recent petitions. At Harvard, a speaker who advocated military help to Britain was booed on Class Day, something that has rarely happened in Harvard history. It would have been inconceivable in 1916.

But the difference between professors and students is not merely in their attitude toward war; it extends to a whole set of judgments about society. The professors tend to think in moral terms, sometimes at the expense of practical considerations. The students

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as a class avoid moral issues; as MacLeish says, they even distrust words in general. They don't believe anything unless they see it with their eyes, and older people would say that they try to keep their eyes closed. They are not pacifists, for pacifism is an attitude that requires deep moral convictions; most of them would fight "if we had to" or "if we were invaded." There is, however, a group of Middle Western students at Amherst who decided that in case of a German invasion our army should retire to the Alleghanies, since the East was decadent anyway and not worth saving. That, of course, is an extreme and possibly burlesque example; but students in general say they want to play safe and "not stick our necks out."

No matter what course this country chooses or is forced to follow—and there are good arguments for two or three different courses—most older people would agree that this state of mind is a singularly bad preparation for a world in which moral issues have become more important to national defense than armies or navies. France was defeated by just this sort of thinking. Somebody must be to blame for it in America—but who or what should serve as scapegoat?

Hitler's victories have been like the stone that Cadmus threw among the children of the dragon's teeth; immediately everyone began quarreling with his nearest neighbor. Liberals like Waldo Frank and Lewis Mumford blamed other liberals, and liberalism in general. A man like Archibald MacLeish, who all his life has thought and felt in literary terms, put the blame on other men of letters. He even wondered whether "the complete confession, the uttermost despair, the farthest doubt" are not luxuries that writers living in these dangerous times should deny themselves—in other words, he questioned the general validity of literature. It seems to us that all these attacks are misdirected, however honest their intentions. The real blame rests elsewhere.

It rests, first of all, with the politicians who lied about our reasons for going into the First World War. A real case can be made for our fighting that war, as well as what seems to us now a better case for staying out of it. But the real case is not the one that the politicians presented to the public; and they succeeded in making words like "democracy," "justice" and "our brave allies" for a long time distasteful to honest mouths. Other words were spoiled by the business men who ruled the country in the post-war years. After the collapse of the Great Red Scare in 1921, people of good faith could no longer say "patriotism" or "vigilante" or "100-percent American" without retching. The financiers who got us into the depression were responsible for the cheapening of words like "individualism" and "self-reliance." The radicals who promised to get us out of the depression through an international proletarian revolution were responsible for our losing faith in every word they used and abandoned as a slogan—beginning with "international" and "proletarian." If one tried to give a full explanation of why young Americans have ceased to believe in words, one would have to repeat the history of America since they were children.

Writers and teachers had their share in the process. But the guilty ones are not Hemingway and Dos Passos, or Dewey and Beard, or anyone else who tried to give an honest picture of the world he knew. The guilty teachers are those who tried to abolish war by ignoring it; who told their students that "war never settled anything" without telling them what would settle anything; and said that "nobody ever won a war," as if it followed that nobody ever lost one either. Why should they be surprised today if their students still believe what they were taught? The guilty writers are the second-raters and Johnny-come-latelies, the men who wrote cynically about war and peace, reducing everything to propaganda and backstage maneuvers—but only after cynicism had become an easy and profitable attitude for writers to assume, in other words, a racket. If this magazine has sometimes published writing of this type, which we tried hard to avoid, we hereby do penance for our sins. We have never been doctrinaire pacifists, and our efforts to keep this country out of danger have been directed toward keeping it from being tricked into war for other than compelling reasons of justice and survival.

In any case, the important question now is not to portion out the guilt; historians can do that in fifty years. Our own task—and especially that of the younger generation—is to learn to see a new world, honestly and painfully, as Hemingway and Dos Passos did in the 1920's. But if we do succeed in opening our eyes, the world before us will not be the same, for their post-war world has now crashed into pieces so small that nobody could ever put them together.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

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A National Policy for Defense

A Special Section

I. The Possibilities We Face

FOR AMERICANS the world has been turned upside down since May 10. Whatever they may have said, they had hitherto been firmly confident that the Allies would sooner or later win the war. They were suddenly faced by the discovery that the German war machine was very nearly as good as Hitler had been saying all the time that it was, and that the British and French forces were far weaker than we had been told. It is not yet clear to what extent the German advantage has been based upon new methods and superior equipment as against defeatism, incompetence or even treachery in important places in France. From the American point of view the result is the same: this country is suddenly confronted by the possibility of a world in which the British, French and Dutch Empires might be broken up, the British and French fleets destroyed or in German hands, the United States left as the only great anti-fascist nation in a world in which four huge empires are either openly or covertly fascist.

One result has been to frighten a lot of Americans half out of their wits. Another has been that everyone has rushed forward with his pet idea, insisting it is the indispensable preliminary to preparedness. This is especially true of the Roosevelt-haters, the enemies of the New Deal, the Americans who are fascist in spirit whether they know it or not. They have been prompt to insist that we can only prepare by smashing labor standards, curtailing social security and putting "real business men" in charge of the government—with one such real business man, perhaps Wendell Willkie, in the White House. To match the hysterics on one side we have on the other the limited group which still insists that we have no true stake in Europe's war, that Hitler has no hostile designs on us, that if we will just stay home and mind our own business we are safe with little or no addition to our present armament.

In order to examine the future as realistically as possible, we need to look at the possible outcomes of the present war.

There is certainly a chance, if Hitler wins in the next few months, that Germany will be so exhausted by the war effort that she will attack no one else for a long time to come. It would be unwise, however, to bank too heavily upon such an outcome. The recuperative power of the dictatorships is probably high, and especially after the victorious conclusion of a war which produces the most tremendous amount of loot in the history of the world. Certainly the United States would not be justified in putting forth anything less than the maximum possible effort because of the expectation that Hitler would pause for several years before continuing his aggressive policy.

This is not to say that if Hitler wins the present war the United States is certain to be his next victim. It is reasonable to suppose that he might first of all turn against Russia, whose Ukrainian "breadbasket" he has so often and so enviously contemplated. No one will waste any time pointing out that Russia's tacit friendship made the present war possible and will have caused Hitler's victory, if he wins. Hitler's promises are worthless, and it is impossible to placate him by proffering friendship. This egomaniac, who listens only to his inward voices and for whom the outside world does not exist, moves implacably toward what he considers his fate. Stalin knows this and it is almost certain that terror of a German attack is what has caused him to rush troops into Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

What would be the outcome of a war between victorious Hitler and Russia? The best informed judgment at this time seems to be that Hitler would win. Russia suffers terribly from the disorganization of her industry and transportation. Her army was badly hurt by the purges, although it would fight better in a defensive war on Russian soil than it did in attacking Finland. So far as the United States is concerned, whatever the outcome of such a war, it would give us additional time to prepare ourselves. If Hitler were defeated, the danger to us would be much less, and of a radically different character.

It is possible that after defeating Britain, Germany would decide not to go to war with Russia. We might see the fascist bloc—Germany, Italy, Russia and Japan —following a common foreign policy for some years, the immediate purpose of which would be to pick up as much loot as possible in the Western Hemisphere.

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In that case, it would be natural for Japan and Germany to work together in a "squeeze play" against the United States, just as Germany and Italy have done against France. Such a coalition could only be temporary, since the aims of the four totalitarian powers are divergent and eventually must conflict; but "temporary," in this case, might give us a very bad decade.

It is possible that this war may end in a stalemate, as the last war would probably have done if the United States had not entered it in 1917. In that case the United States, without going to war, may play an important part in the peace conference. We might be able to force an exhausted Germany to keep out of this hemisphere entirely. While almost any sort of peace might follow a stalemate, it is hard to envision one in which the United States would feel safe with its present armament, or anything less than a huge increase.

The final possible alternative is the one which at this moment seems least likely of all: a clear-cut German defeat. By overrunning France, Hitler has enormously improved his position: not only was Turkey afraid to fulfill her pledges to the Allies, but we may expect the entire Danubian and Balkan area to swing into the German orbit. It is barely possible that Stalin might be sufficiently alarmed by Hitler's successes to take active steps against him. In ascending order of improbability these would be (1) genuine neutrality, (2) participation in an economic boycott and blockade, (3) going to war. If Stalin did any of these and the British retained control of the sea, they might still be able to starve Germany out, though with all the resources of Europe available to Hitler, the process would probably take decades rather than years.

The other possibility, which of course presupposes Britain's ability to withstand the attempted German invasion, would be final British superiority in the air. The British claim that German losses of airplanes and pilots are four times as great as their own, that their men and planes are individually far superior. It is entirely possible that British and American production together could within six months or a year put out Germany's eyes and slowly over a long time break down her war effort. The United States would again be able as in the past to count on the protection of the British fleet. We would certainly, however, increase our armament far above its present level.

I have omitted from this discussion the possibility that the United States will go to war, first because it seems likely that the final decision in Europe will have been reached before our mounting war spirit reaches that point, and second, because there is little difference between a war fought with our machinery and one in which we supply both machinery and men.

There can be very few people any longer who do not admit that it is of overwhelming importance to the United States for Great Britain to win if it is within the realm of human possibility. If Britain goes down we are faced with a totalitarian world whose outlook is of the blackest for us. The production of war materials for British defense is literally for our own defense as well. Britain is not asking us to give her anything; she is still paying cash and can do so for some time to come; but if we were asked to contribute weapons as a gift they would still be the best possible investment. A dollar spent now to help Britain can save us ten dollars later on if we have to arm against a potential simultaneous menace by Germany, Italy, Japan—and conceivably even Russia as well. BRUCE BLIVEN

II. How We Can Help Britain

MR. ROOSEVELT has promised help to Britain to "the full material resources of this nation." From every sign, the American people are eager to make the necessary effort to redeem the pledge in full. We would rather give aid to Britain now than later on find ourselves fighting Nazidom alone.

The kind of aid that Britain will want depends on the military developments of the next few weeks and months. Will Englishmen be able to defend their island fortress? The quickest aid that we can bring them will consist of raw materials and semi-manufactured products. It must be realized that Britain has sustained heavy economic losses in the collapse of Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Norway. From these countries she drew a large part of her iron ore, lumber, pulp and paper, food and a great variety of specialized manufactures. The surrender of France, although an unparalleled military disaster, disadvantaged Britain less economically.

We can supply nearly all the raw materials lost by Hitler's conquest of western Europe. For the most part, our raw materials are ready near transportation points and can go forward without delay. It would be a greater help, however, if many of these raw materials—including certain kinds of food—were manufactured, processed and fabricated before they left our shores. Since the coming to power of Prime Minister Churchill and Minister of Supply Herbert Morrison, large sections of British industry are supposed to have been thrown into munitions-making. We can help set free plant capacity by becoming a workshop for Britain's non-military requirements.

What Englishmen want desperately, however, are military airplanes—and ordnance and tanks to replace those lost at Dunkerque. Here our assistance will fall tragically short of their needs. From the outbreak of war last September up to May 31, it is understood

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that Britain and France, together, received a total of about two thousand planes from this country. Production is now rising substantially; in the present month of June, American deliveries may reach eight hundred. British production is also rising fast; it is at least twice that of this country, but British and American production combined is probably not two-thirds of the Nazi output.

The Roosevelt administration has already ransacked our reserve stocks of arms. Through the legal device of private corporations, we are selling about two hundred and eighty "obsolete" planes—Northrops, generally considered superior to the Junker "stukas," and Curtiss SBC4's. Three hundred still older planes may also be sent. In addition, we have agreed to furnish 2,000 75-mm. guns and 600,000 Enfield rifles. The 75's have 1914-18 carriages, disliked by our army. We have also promised to ship over a miscellaneous lot of machine guns, trench mortars, howitzers, together with ammunition—left-overs from the First World War.

This list is pitifully short, but it comprises the chief immediate help in weapons that we can give. Over a longer period—if it is assumed that the British can hold out through the coming summer and winter—our help may easily be decisive. Our theoretical long-term capacity to produce munitions, although by no means limitless, is, with Britain's, almost certainly greater than that of the totalitarian allies, even including the reluctant production of their newly subject states. In practice, however, the speed and volume of the help we can give will necessarily be set by our own rearmament program.

What proportion of the weapons that we shall make in the next six or nine months do we wish to send overseas, what reserve for ourselves? If Britain holds out, this problem will have to be decided. Thanks to the intervention of Mr. Roosevelt, a major part of our existing airplane production is already at her disposal. Deliveries are just beginning to be made on the War Department's orders, given in 1939, for tanks, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery, Garand semi-automatic rifles. From now on, these deliveries will increase with fair rapidity. Shall we send these weapons across the Atlantic or keep them here?

Before the regimes of Secretaries Stimson and Knox the War and Navy Departments worked unremittingly to keep our arms at home. More than a year ago, with the apparent approval of Secretary Woodring, the War Department tried to block French airplane purchases in this country—the Curtisses and Lockheeds that were virtually France's only weapon in the air. The current shipment of military equipment—airplanes, 75-mm. guns and Enfields—might have been dispatched early in May, soon after the German breakthrough in Belgium. It was stubbornly resisted for many days by army officers; all Mr. Roosevelt's authority was needed to bludgeon them into quiescence. As this is written, the army is still preventing Britain from obtaining our great flying fortresses, the most efficient instrument for bombing industrial areas.

The War and Navy Departments may perhaps be excused for their resistance. It is possible honestly to argue that Britain will not be able to hold out, and that weapons sent to her rescue will merely be part of the ultimate German war booty. But our own safety, as well as Britain's salvation, depends on pushing rearmament in this country with the utmost conceivable speed. It is the crucial problem of this second world war. On this quite separate count, the two fighting services seem thoroughly culpable. The delays that have occurred in our 1939 arms program as a result of the personal bad blood between Mr. Woodring and Assistant Secretary Johnson are a national scandal. Despite Mr. Roosevelt's absorbed interest, the navy's leadership has been almost equally weak. On the strictly industrial side of rearmament, the authority to be wielded by Messrs. Knudsen, Stettinius and their colleagues is undefined, shadowy. As a first step, the establishment of a system of industrial priorities modeled on that of 1917-18, and a precise statement of labor policy, seem urgently needed.

Hitler's conquest of the western European coast places enormous burdens on England's sea-borne transportation. Ships that made quick trips to the Continent must now be employed in time-consuming voyages to America and the outlying parts of the Empire. The United States Maritime Commission has already interpreted our laws with great freedom to permit transfers of American shipping to British registry. The amount of new shipping which we could furnish is probably small, because of the congested state of our shipbuilding industry. Since the worst transportation problem will be that of food, however, we might agree to admit part of the as yet uncounted number of Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian and French refugees now in England.

At the moment, Britain apparently does not need American credits. An Allied purchasing official, Sir Louis Beale, recently said that the Allies had spent a billion and a quarter here, and have sixteen billions more to spend. Apparently this represents the total resources of all the Allies that could be mobilized for purchases abroad. According to official United States figures, the Allies have in this country something more than six and a half billions. Two-thirds is in gold, bank balances and easily negotiable securities. It is hard to believe that Britain could spend as much as this for at least another eighteen months if our price level is kept steady. However, it is understood that, if necessary, ways can be found to circumvent the Neutrality and Johnson Acts and put dollar exchange in Britain's hands. One device is to enter into contracts for the future delivery of large amounts of strategic raw materials—tin, nickel, rubber—essential for our own defense.

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What naval aid does Britain need? As this is written, the status of the French fleet is in heartbreaking doubt. However, the capital ships of the German, Italian and French fleets combined—those now ready for sea—are outnumbered two to one by the British battleship force. According to report, the sole naval assistance that the British authorities have requested from us is a group of thirty over-age American destroyers, dating from the first World War, now tied up in Atlantic harbors.

The aid here outlined could be given without entering the war and, for the most part, without a formal change in our neutrality statutes. It has been pointed out that, in holding off a Nazi assault on their island, the British desperately need experienced airplane pilots, and that the neutrality regulations forbid them to recruit Americans on our soil. This is true, but a number of Americans have already enlisted in the RAF in Canada, and others will presumably do so. If Britain is overwhelmed, an incalculable, wholly changed, situation will exist. Should the British fleet succeed in escaping Hitler's fury, and should British leaders attempt to keep together the remnants of the Empire for the purpose of continued resistance, the active support of our fleet might become essential, and we may be dragged into open, bloody conflict against totalitarian world conquest.

JONATHAN MITCHELL

III. What Can We Defend?

THE EXISTING STRUCTURE of American defense was built upon the political theory that we could count on the coöperation of the British Empire in any conflict with more than one opponent, and upon a military theory composed of three assumptions. These were: that we faced no insurmountable difficulties with regard to the raw materials of war; that any enemy must approach us across an ocean; and that even in the most unfavorable circumstances this approach would consume so much time that we could meet the enemy at the shore with an emergency army.

The rapidly growing possibility of a complete Axis victory in Europe has demolished the first half of this comfortable doctrine, and the manner in which that triumph is being achieved has vitiated the rest. Even the boast of military-economic self-sufficiency is gone. It depended upon a neutral Netherlands kingdom and our free access to its colonial products. It is now clear that German victory means that Holland will neither be free nor neutral in any war in which we are engaged.

It also means that there will be no neutralities whatever—which is to say that not only international law but military strategy must be revised in accordance with new concepts broadcast from Berlin. For our own safety's sake we are required to defend all the small, weak "neutrals" through which we may be reached. We are driven to a form of preventive imperialism so foreign to our modes of thought and action that the working out of the details is bound to entail considerable anguish in the months immediately before us.

As a matter of fact, if we are granted months in which to work out the new policy it will be because the British Empire proves a tough nut to crack. A power as dynamic as Germany will hardly abandon a career of successful brigandage after a quick victory in Europe, while there are desirable territories open to exploitation by the same methods. And surely Hitler is the last man to have the graciousness to let us set up barriers against whatever he may desire in the new world.

For the old barriers have clearly collapsed; the old concepts must be revised. The offensive against us need no longer be naval. It can be aero-political; it can be politico-military, working through puppet states and alliances. It can even be military-economic, like the drive which has enslaved Sweden without a direct blow.

The emergency army on which we counted, and even the militia army which forms two-thirds of our paper establishment, have been demonstrated as worthless. The pace of totalitarian war will not permit either to be mobilized. Even were the time for mobilization to be had, the technical demands of mechanical war are so severe that militiamen cannot acquire the necessary skill in the time allotted to their training—twenty-one days a year at present. Every indicator points to the idea that wars of the future must be fought out with the human and mechanical means ready to go into action at the beginning.

A navy has the advantage of being ready by definition, and we have a good one left over from the days before Norway—quite good enough at present to stand up against any two others exclusive of the British. Nor is this proportion likely to alter in our disfavor during the period it would take to build up other means of defense. We have six battleships building; no combination of hungry powers has more.

Anything the navy and its attached air service can defend, we can keep and protect. How much ground does this take in?

By general definition it includes all those spots to which the only practicable approaches are by water, and which lie within 2,500 miles of an American fleet base. Twenty-five hundred miles is the operating range of our fleet—the distance to which it can go on its own legs, fight a battle and return. If it ventures beyond

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this limit it must either find a base at the end of the trip or drag fuel-carriers with it—an intolerable condition in the face of an enemy because of the vulnerability of these vessels.

In the specific case Hawaii falls easily within the magic circle of the American fleet's range, the more since it is itself a fleet base. So does Alaska, where a theoretical enemy approach by air would have to base on Kamchatka, unsupported by supply lines and itself within range of our fleet. From Dutch Harbor down to Callao the Pacific Coast is so hemmed in by mountains on the eastern side, so easily within range of the fleet on the west, that it may be considered immune to fortune.

On the Atlantic side Greenland, like Alaska, offers a theoretical air approach, but there is so little useful land there that in a military sense the place consists only of a sheltered anchorage, untenable by any power that could not hold the sea. A sporadic raid might be run through the route; an attack, hardly. All eastern Canada, including Newfoundland, falls into the general definition and is beyond the range of any foreign fleet that must deal with opposition. So is Bermuda, and so the eastern coast of the United States, down to the beginning of a twilight zone representing the limit operating radius of airplanes based on the northernmost of the "small neutrals"—Mexico, Cuba, the Bahamas. At present this twilight zone begins at about the Virginia-North Carolina border, darkening southward; technical progress in aviation may extend it.

Yet it is hopelessly unrealistic to assume that the navy alone can defend all these regions because it can defend any of them. A larger navy might; the present one may have to choose.

For one of the most arresting features of the technique of total war has been the ability of its practitioners to obtain diversion and dispersion of opposing forces by creating a crisis in one area as a prelude to an attack in another. As Allied armies were attracted to the Near East before the slash into Scandinavia, so we might be whipsawed between Atlantic and Pacific —even if we make the not altogether justified assumption that the Panama Canal will be open, to permit the fleet to make its run between the two operating areas in the minimum time of three weeks.

More striking than the inclusions in this list are the omissions, the places undefended against the new form of war by an unassisted fleet. Guam is the most striking of such omissions in the Pacific. It is 3,300 miles from Hawaii, totally unfortified and without dockage facilities. Even for the limited amount of defense afforded by air it requires a flying field not now in existence and the dredging of the harbor to clear out subsurface knobs that lie ready to tear the bottom from a seaplane attempting to land.

It is not too much to say that Guam is the key to whatever Pacific problems face us, or would face us in the event of an Axis victory. Stoutly fortified, dredged and supplied with docks, it instantly checks any Japanese drive to the south until it has been eliminated. If dockage at Manila could be added to the fortification of Guam (the only dock there now will take nothing bigger than a cruiser) our navy could cover the Philippines and make secure against any possible attack the vital routes to the rubber, tin, tungsten, chromium and wool of the South Seas. The possibility of Axis victory and the removal of the protecting mantle of the British navy, so long cast over these routes, turns congressional objections to the fortification of Guam because it might offend the dear, good, kind Japanese into the same sort of clotted nonsense that got the men of Munich into trouble.

Without the fleet, Alaska also is something of a danger point; probably it should have something more than the two naval air bases and the single army air base now under construction there. But on the whole, the Pacific defensive problem is a relatively light one in comparison with those that face us in the Atlantic or Caribbean.

Above all the Caribbean. The North Atlantic area, for all the weakness of the "peace frontier" with Canada, presents no problems that would not be solved by the same means required in the south. In fact, the Caribbean region may be regarded as an extreme case of the North Atlantic.

It is starred with those "small neutrals" which are the bearing points for those new forms of attack made in Germany—the fifth column, the Trojan Horse and the sudden intrusion of armed force. One of these nations—Mexico—already has powerful pro-fascist groups. On at least two others—Curaçao, Surinam—an Axis victory would give the Nazis a strong legal claim. It is entirely possible that such a victory might be followed by the cession, so far as legal documents could complete it, of others even more dangerous to us—British Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Trinidad, Cayenne. Others—Dominica, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Colombia—are chronically revolutionary, persistently anti-Yankee. Farther south, but not too far to exercise a powerful influence on Caribbean affairs if the Nazi technique of gradual encirclement were applied there, lies Brazil, already the seat of a pan-German, pro-fascist movement.

At present, we are practically without defenses against Axis political activity in these places, or against the sudden military stroke that follows a political upheaval, or against the violent direct attack that treads on the heels of the military seizure. Our insignificant army—six regular divisions, with equipment for three—could hardly make a contest in any of these countries, even were it spared from home defense. An Axis victory this summer, followed by a lightning stroke into the Caribbean, would find us

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reduced to the dangerous expedient of calling in the navy from the Pacific, and the probably futile one of counter-attack by air—the methods used by England in Norway and the Lowlands.

It is true that our fleet would be of more use to us than England's was to her. The sea-lanes from Europe are long, and even the Axis has nothing to compare with our naval air service. Nevertheless, and in view of the fact that the attack may come in several directions at once, our obvious necessity is to supplement the existing measures with others sufficient to make the third stage in the process—the attack on the American homeland—impossibly difficult. This means air force and army; but how much? It is probable that there will be little agreement on the question, but a certain approximation can be arrived at from the fact that before the war in Europe the Initial Protective Force seen as necessary while a large-scale emergency army was being raised was set at 647,000 men—227,000 regulars, 420,000 National Guards.

The numerical requirements presumably need some slight revision upward, in view of the ease with which total war spans sea-gaps by means of air and surprise. But suppose they do not; European experience demonstrates so radical a change in the technical and equipment demands that the National Guard is thrown back to the level of the emergency army as a force that would only be useful during the later stages of a three or four-year war. That is, the minimum protective requirement for our home soil is a standing army, fully equipped, at least three times the size of the present one, and an air force to match. The President's 50,000 planes are not too many; they will yield only about 15,000 combat machines.

This flatly means conscription. The more attractive naval and air services have already exhausted the volunteer crop. With conscription raising the army to IPF requirements, and provided we are granted the two or three years necessary to equip and to train such an army, we can defend the continental United States—probably with a good deal of damage to the physical plant of the country, and certainly with a great deal of damage to its social, political and economic structure. But for full defense, hemisphere defense against the devices of totalitarian war, with its encroachments by easy stages, we need far more than the IPF. Probably a standing army of a hundred divisions—more than 1,500,000 men—would not be too much, though all figures are guesswork at present.

Yet the fundamental requirement is not for men or material, but for an entire recasting of the national mental pattern; the abandonment of that sentimental, string-glove pacifism which has been as much the mark of the American people as it was of the Chamberlain Cabinet.

If this is a plunge into militarism, then at least it is a militarism of our own choice, and whose development we may reasonably hope to control through the democratic process, instead of the gloomy and terrible militarism now being imposed on the other democracies by an enemy already within the gates.

FLETCHER PRATT

IV. The Defense of a Free Nation

For many years, Nazi Germany has been busily engaged in total rearmament, in preparing her military and war-economic organizations for an ultimate showdown. This gigantic program has been carried out at the cost of an ever increasing enslavement of the German masses and the destruction of all the traditional moral values of European civilization. The Western democracies were rather late and hesitant in their response. They were anxious to preserve the principles of democratic freedom even during their own period of gradual rearmament and throughout the first stages of this war. In striking contrast to practices in the totalitarian dictatorships, British and French labor organizations were left practically untouched. The masses were permitted to live a life in which the dignity of man was preserved. Existing liberties were left intact. Censorship was not used to muzzle the press into uncritical servitude, and opposition political parties were retained for the better expression of public opinion.

Today, if the furious offensive of the German war machine can be halted at all, it will stop at the very brink of the abyss. Therefore the question must be raised whether it is possible for a democratic state to carry out a vigorous counter-attack on a totalitarian power while it preserves its own libertarian institutions. Does not Britain's tragic example reveal that democracy as a national principle handicaps defensive measures? On the other hand, if a war against totalitarianism brings on the suppression of democratic liberties, is it not senseless to combat Nazi and Fascist ideologies by using the same methods of terroristic statesmanship?

Let us say at once that Germany's present impressive superiority of arms is not due to her status as a totalitarian state at war with free, democratic countries. It was not "democracy" that brought about Britain's present perilous plight. It was a reactionary, conservative regime which, throughout the years of Hitler's ascendancy, anxiously worked for closer coöperation with Nazism. This fact has been strikingly reiterated by Sir Nevile Henderson, who shows on almost every page of his book, "Failure of a Mission," that all

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his activities as British Ambassador to Berlin were based on instructions received from and in complete accordance with the intentions of Neville Chamberlain. Fatally misjudging the true strength of German military might, this regime indulged in the comforting illusion that the inevitable war could be waged without disturbing the normality of life or the privileges of the upper classes.

It was not democracy that failed Britain. It was rather the predominating spirit of Britain's aristocratic shopkeepers, who were unable to appreciate the supreme importance of the time element and had spent precious months bargaining in the United States for more reasonable prices before placing orders for urgently needed planes with American manufacturers. By the time they were able to obtain prices which they deemed acceptable, the tide had turned and it was too late. The signing of contracts was postponed from month to month, and the consequence of this tardiness is now shown in Germany's overwhelming superiority in the air. Democracy is not to be blamed for the inadequate training of soldiers, for the insufficient supply of planes, tanks and other implements of war. On the contrary, all this is the irreparable fault of the reactionary leadership, some of whose members directly sympathized with Hitler's principles.

The appointment of Winston Churchill and Labor's entry into the government brought about fundamental changes in Britain. Today all available forces of the nation are united in a concentrated effort to increase the national defense to the attainable maximum. It is true that Britain was compelled to suspend many of her civil liberties for this transitory period. But by doing so, did Britain become a totalitarian state herself in the Nazi sense? The answer to this question is of central importance. Aside from revealing the actual process of developments in Britain, it provides us with information relevant to those crucial problems which the United States also will have to face in due course.

The Germany of Hitler which embarked upon the war in 1939 was entirely different from the Kaiser's Germany of 1914. Then the war was started with only a military general staff, to which was added an economic general staff during the course of the war. The Third Reich was quick to learn this important lesson. The new Germany entered the war with economic as well as military general staffs. More than that—at the outbreak of the war Germany possessed an almost perfectly functioning coördination between these two branches.

Britain is still far from the goal which the Nazis had safely reached prior to the start of hostilities. The British army has had to be created during the war, since compulsory military service was introduced only a few months before war broke out. Simultaneously, she has had to organize her entire armament economy. Up to the appointment of the Churchill government, no perceptible attempts were made to coördinate Britain's military and war-economic general staffs. By putting representatives of the Labor Party and the trade unions in charge of all decisive war-economic posts, Britain, too, is now endeavoring to carry out this coördination. Britain's economic general staff is entrusted to Herbert Morrison and Ernest Bevin.

An economic general staff in firm coöperation with the military general staff represents a sweeping transition in the British economic system, as it must necessarily in all countries of liberal economy where private industrialists still determine the volume, quality and means of production. At this point Britain's new economic coördinators must encroach on the structure of the traditional economic system. Apart from problems of human replacements in factories which were stripped of workers now called to the colors, it has to attain the most efficient production of planes, guns, tanks, munitions and other implements of war. Furthermore, it must obtain the continuity of production of all essential consumer goods. In order to reach this goal, it is compelled to introduce planning on the largest possible scale. This same economic general staff must hold executive power in all dealings with foreign countries. It decides (a) what may be imported, (b) the priority of imports and (c) the countries of origin and means of transportation. At the same time it decrees export regulations. At home, it prescribes what should be produced and, in view of the increasing vulnerability of industrial districts to enemy air attacks, also determines where the production should take place. In fact, it directs the entire production apparatus and, in conjunction, the investment of capital. It determines the places of employment and working hours; it takes care of the transfer of workers. It determines wages and fixes prices. It prepares the financing of all armament efforts.

Though the objectives of planned economy now encroaching on Britain's economic system are enormous, it must emphatically be stated that her total war economy is diametrically opposed to that of the Nazi state. Germany depends on the terror apparatus of the Gestapo to organize her economy for war. The workers' opposition to the brutal methods of economic totalitarianism was crushed by all available means, by concentration camps and inhuman cruelty. Germany abolished her free press, prohibited political parties and free labor organizations and made it a capital offense to listen to foreign broadcasts.

Britain made her way toward war economy by a different path. Even though the state's control of national economy increased to a considerable degree, listening to even the most rabid of Nazi propaganda broadcasts is permitted and Alfred Duff Cooper, Minister of Information, refused to ban the publication of communiqués issued by the German High Command

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in the British press. Freedom of the press and the preservation of opposition parties permits criticism of the government and open discussion of all public matters. In other words, Britain has an economy planned for war in which important elements of liberal economy are temporarily suspended, but one that has been decreed and is enforced by the active coöperation of the workers, who voluntarily gave their consent to these emergency measures. At the last moment Great Britain fully realized that if the war is to be conducted as the struggle of democracy against the Nazi regime of terror, the British masses must know not only against what but also for what they are fighting. Britain knows that the decisive difference between her planned economy and Germany's terror regime depends on the realization of a maximum of social democracy within this planned war economy.

Certain progressive elements were ready to acknowledge this necessity even while Mr. Chamberlain was still at 10 Downing Street. John Maynard Keynes, though neither a Laborite nor a left-wing economist, developed a program for the financing of the war and submitted it to the public in his book "How to Pay for the War." This program was attacked from the Left, which claimed that the Keynes plan would inflict additional hardships on the working classes. Under fire of criticism, Keynes revised his book and remarked in his preface:

> In the first version I was mainly concerned with questions of financial technique and did not secure the full gain in social justice for which this technique opened the way. In this revision, therefore, I have endeavored to snatch from the exigency of war positive social improvements. . . . And [I] now propose a plan conceived in a spirit of social justice, a plan which uses a time of general sacrifice, not as an excuse for postponing desirable reforms, but as an opportunity for moving further than we have moved hitherto towards reducing inequalities.

Keynes's proposals were primarily concerned with a minimum allowance to be paid by the state to families with many children:

> At first sight it is paradoxical to propose in time of war an expensive social reform which we have not thought ourselves able to afford in time of peace. But in truth the need for this reform is so much greater in such times that it may provide the most appropriate occasion for it.

Keynes made these suggestions before Hitler invaded the Low Countries, at a time when a direct attack on Britain was but a remote nightmare, before Churchill became Prime Minister and before labor leaders occupied the decisive posts in Britain's war economy. But while Chamberlain's government remained in office, Keynes's proposals were not carried out. First, some reactionary elements had to be expelled from the Cabinet, those elements which were responsible for the failure of Britain's foreign policy and her muddled war-economic efforts. Now his proposals are being discussed anew. Britain today is trying to execute all the requirements of a comprehensive war economy while also striving to remain a free nation where the progress of democracy may be further advanced.

In all essential points the United States faces a different necessity. At present, it is engaged in developing its own war economy from a temporarily narrow military basis. America's present war-economic sector is even less developed than was that of Britain at the time of the Munich conference. On the other hand, the New Deal created certain elements of planned economy which are more distinct than those existing in Britain at the outbreak of the war. In all important products, the United States is considerably richer than Britain. In addition, it possesses enormous labor reserves in the ten million unemployed, as well as plant reserves in its not yet fully utilized productive capacity.

Britain today is compelled to restrict the food and goods consumption of her population, since she is incapable of simultaneously training four million men for the army, executing a gigantic armament program at forced speed and providing the masses with peacetime quantities of consumers' goods. A similar economy would probably not be necessary for the United States, certainly not at this stage of events. As long as the military budget of the United States does not exceed a limit set between $10,000,000,000 and $15,000,000,000 each year, production of consumers' goods need not be reduced, since the added armament production may be carried out in addition to the normal production for civilian purposes. There is, however, one pre-condition of a vast further development of planned economy. The broader America's war economy becomes, the more important will be the establishment of an economic general staff, together with a broadening of the state's control of the economy at large.

But let us emphasize once more that the introduction of a considerable war-economy control is by no means identical with making a step toward the creation of a totalitarian state on Hitler's pattern. Of course, such developments may make for totalitarian factors, but only if reactionary forces gain the upper hand during the transition. This, however, can be prevented. Therefore the slogan should not be, "Against planned economy and against war-economic control"; the slogan should be, "For planned economy, for the development of a military economy and a simultaneous expansion of social democracy."

Here, as in Great Britain, *deeds* should prove to the masses that democracy's struggle with Hitler's regime still holds the promise of furthering and developing democracy even in times of crisis.

FRITZ STERNBERG

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V. The Future of Pan-Americanism

To refer to the European war as welding together the twenty-one republics of the Western Hemisphere has become a commonplace. A totalitarian victory at the end of the present conflict, however, would not only strain old bonds but create new ones. For, despite the growth of Pan-Americanism, the Americas are not an economic, and even less a political, unit. It is possible—even probable—that they must become completely integrated to survive in a period when isolation has changed from a pleasant dream to a nerve-shattering nightmare.

The present crisis has provided Pan-Americanism with new justification, and with a wide field of action in the economic and political defense of the Western Hemisphere. The Americas have demonstrated their identity of political ideals—if not always of practice—and were quick to adopt a common neutrality policy after the outbreak of war. Procedures to minimize the shock of the conflict on the inter-American economic structure were immediately devised and, over an extended period of neutrality while Europe was at war, a mutually satisfactory economic relationship might have developed among the American nations within the present framework of Pan-American machinery and institutions. The rapid pace of events in Europe, however, has drastically altered the war problem of the Americas—from one of gradual adjustment to reduce dislocations caused by lost European markets and sources of supply, to one of creating a war economy itself.

Whether imperialism or stark realism is engendered by the collapse of the old order in Europe, it is more than ever true that this country must not be cut off from Latin America. The United States could not conduct a war indefinitely without this economic support. The twenty Latin American countries cannot defend themselves in a military sense. But together a bloc may be developed which would contain the economic and military essentials for riding out any future storm. If this hemisphere is to be the stronghold of democratic institutions, it must be buttressed by adequate and effective economic coöperation among the component nations. The "hands across the Rio Grande" Pan-Americanism of a gentler era is not enough.

It has become almost axiomatic to say that the "United States is safe so long as no overseas power establishes a military base of operation on this hemisphere." Since the swastika is disturbingly prone to follow the Aski mark, it might now be said with equal truth that the "United States is safe so long as Germany has no economic foothold in the Western Hemisphere." The plain truth of the matter is that an Axis victory in Europe involves extension of United States control over British, Dutch and French colonial possessions in Latin America. It involves new and drastic measures to strengthen the Western Hemisphere against the Trojan horses of an alien system. Unfortunately, the steps necessary to preserve democracy in the New World will undoubtedly dilute it, but a strategic ideological retreat is evidently the only means of combating totalitarianism.

What are these "new and drastic" measures? In the first place, it seems clear that the United States must be prepared to bolster Latin America in order to prevent its "economic seduction" by Germany. Mere friendship, or even "protection," carries little weight when competing with direct economic gain. The political philosophy and military methods of a victorious Germany may well be repugnant to Argentina, Chile or Mexico, but these nations are not likely to spurn sales of wheat, meat and minerals for lofty moral principles. In Brazil the "virility" of the Axis partners has already found official approbation. It remains to be seen how many Latin American nations might be attracted to the totalitarian camp if it is made economically worth while. The new responsibility of Pan-Americanism is to see that it will not be worth while.

The economic structures of the United States and Latin America are not fully complementary, and sheer will to bring about a closed Western Hemisphere economy could not create it. Inter-American trade relations are close, but both the United States and Latin America have large exportable surpluses which cannot be absorbed by the other. For Latin America, which normally sells abroad about one-third of its entire production, exports are a life and death matter. This country, on the other hand, exports only about eight percent of its production, although foreign sales are highly important to cotton and tobacco producers and to certain manufacturing industries. In addition, the United States is powerful enough to deal with totalitarian states without the risk of being undermined politically. So far as the economic defense of the Western Hemisphere is concerned, the crux of the post-war inter-American trade problem lies in finding markets for Latin American commodities. It is infinitely more important for Brazilian coffee growers to receive adequate returns without political strings than for General Motors or Standard Oil to maintain lucrative foreign markets.

During the past few years Latin America has sold an average of approximately $600,000,000 worth of goods to the United States, $200,000,000 worth to other Western Hemisphere countries, and $1,200,000,000 worth to the outside world. It is probable that, even on short notice, the United States could

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expand consumption of Latin American goods—without internal economic dislocation—by as much as $200,000,000 annually and, over a period of time devoted to exploring new resources and developing new commodities, the proportion could be considerably augmented. In this connection, it may be recalled that from 1914 to 1918 United States imports from Latin America rose by $640,000,000, although a large part of this increase represented inflated price levels.

As an emergency measure in the economic and political defense of the Western Hemisphere against a Nazi-dominated Europe, establishment of an Inter-American Marketing Board, with full control over the foreign trade of the Western Hemisphere, might be a key feature of the new Pan-Americanism. Such a board —of necessity financed in large part by United States capital, perhaps through the intermediary of the Inter-American Bank—would preferably represent all twenty-one American republics, although almost inevitably control and responsibility would devolve upon the United States.

The first task of such a board would be to shift United States imports to Latin America in so far as possible, apportioning purchases among the individual Latin American countries in accordance with previous production or exports of the specific commodities involved. The board would also be empowered to acquire and market all other Latin American export products. Such exports would be used to fill the demands of the United States and other American republics, while the surplus would be disposed of in accordance with both the political policy of the New World and the economic needs of the Old.

How much would it "cost" the United States to underpin the Latin American export market? Assuming, under the circumstances outlined, an immediate increase of at least $200,000,000 in this country's Latin American imports, there would remain—on the basis of the 1936-38 average—a surplus of about $1,000,000,000 worth of goods normally sold outside the Western Hemisphere. This surplus, in the single year 1938, included approximately 10,000,000 bags of coffee, 700,000 tons of meat, at least 5,600,000 bags of sugar, 200,000 tons of wool, 1,500,000 bales of cotton, 200,000 tons of hides and skins, 1,950,000 tons of wheat and 2,737,000 tons of corn, to mention only a few major commodities. For economic reasons, an Inter-American Marketing Board could not throw these products on the United States market without serious internal repercussions on the price structure and normal trade channels. On the other hand, Latin American products bought in the interests of defense would include many commodities now bought in part elsewhere: for example, wool, hides and skins, cacao, fibers, various nuts, waxes and vegetable oils and a number of minerals—including tin, provided smelters are established. Presumably a board with the powers contemplated would find opportunities to dispose of most surplus Latin American products without subjecting the individual countries to the danger of dealing directly with Germany. Even if the $1,000,000,000 were pure loss to the United States, moreover, it would still be a small price to pay for strengthening Latin American resistance to Nazi economic penetration.

"Remember when we were just college clucks and used to go on those peace strikes?"

The emergency aspects of a Pan-American program of this type lie in immediate assumption by the United States of full responsibility for the economic welfare of the Latin American republics. In addition, efforts to encourage production of complementary products in Latin America must continue at a rate faster than heretofore in order that the economic structure of the Western Hemisphere may be brought more closely into balance. This would lessen the danger that the United States might subsidize indefinitely the production of unwanted products. Meanwhile, the surpluses acquired might play an important role in bargaining with the German masters of a starving Europe.

Whatever shape or shapes it may take, whatever specific plans are evolved, the machinery of Pan-Americanism must be operated at a pace commensurate with developments abroad. There is little doubt that the twenty-one republics of this hemisphere must coöperate, economically and politically, on a scale which would have appeared fantastic even a few weeks ago. As the strongest partner, the United States must take the initiative and thus expose itself to charges of "Yankee imperialism" and of making economic capital out of political catastrophe. The immediate problem of defending the Western Hemisphere, however, leaves little time for quibbling over ideological abstractions, since democracy itself evidently cannot be defended by purely pacific methods. The task is not that of saving or capturing Latin American markets for the United States, but of throwing an economic and military *cordon sanitaire* around the Americas.

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VI. If Britain Goes Under: A Speculation

IF HITLER DEFEATS BRITAIN, after finishing with France, the rest of the British Empire and Commonwealth will have to adopt a *sauve qui peut* policy. A powerful effort will be made to gather the shattered British communities around focal points of power and link the units together for mutual defense. The foci will be the dominions—above all others, Canada. The outcome of such a vast salvaging operation cannot be exactly forecast, but some reasonable guesses can be made. This is one man's guess.

The economic consequences of the collapse of the United Kingdom will be almost paralyzing. The collapse will demonstrate how intimately linked the parts of the British community really are in trade, finance and otherwise. The exchanges will fall into chaos, for almost all British currencies are tied to sterling. In all areas which produce primary products and foodstuffs, the immediate effect will be for vast stores of goods to pile up in the warehouses. Necessity will dictate that farmers, graziers and miners cut down production as rapidly as possible. This will bring acute suffering to millions of people. Economies cannot be reorganized overnight. No matter how manufacturing may be speeded up, there will be thousands of surplus workers hanging about. Many of these, of course, will be drafted into the rapidly expanding local defense forces, organized in a desperate effort to save the nation.

The psychological effect of economic chaos, when added to the shock of British capitulation, will be more devastating than most Americans imagine. As a group, the British peoples overseas are unprepared for a catastrophic reverse. Their leaders in all fields have not only refused to imagine such an upshot to the war, but they have also rancorously attacked those who have hinted at even the slightest decline of the United Kingdom's power. They have created an intellectual atmosphere in which the platitudes of international politics are called "sinister remarks." Churchill's rhetorical reference to a retreat from Britain is taken by all but a tiny minority as rhetoric pure and simple, with no basis in reality. If it were suddenly translated into reality, hundreds of thousands of Britishers, now grimly determined to carry on, would fall into a blue funk. To them the United Kingdom is not merely a temporal phenomenon which may pass away; it is as impregnable a part of reality as the sun, moon and stars. The disappearance of these from their ken would hardly disturb them more than the collapse of British power in the British Isles.

Any future British power will, then, have to emerge out of chaos at the centers around which it will be organized. Worse still, it will have to be salvaged while the Nazis are grabbing all they can and while the Italians and Japanese are gathering up their share of the booty too. The only stabilizing force outside the British world will be the United States. American policy is a key to the British future.

The colonies of the United Kingdom, with certain exceptions, will pass from British control. In Africa no more can possibly be salvaged than the Union of South Africa can manage to retain in the face of German and Italian demands. If these powers quickly get control of the French African colonies, pressure against the Union will immediately be exerted. They will begin by demanding the very colonies—the Rhodesias, Tanganyika, etc.—which might strengthen the Union if it could hold them. The Union will not be a strong focal point of future British power. While the separatist sentiment there would seem to provide a strong psychological base for independence, the material conditions are weak, but the pro-British Smuts government will fight bitterly against Britain's enemies, because only with the African colonial areas in friendly hands can it hope to retain power. Nevertheless concerted hostile pressure, which will certainly be exerted on the Union, will quickly bring it to heel. The only likely source of outside aid will be from Australia across the Indian Ocean, but Australia will be too busy with her own troubles to do much. With the passing of the Union, the British will be through in Africa.

The passing of the British from eastern Asia has so often been prophesied that it is hardly necessary to state that the collapse of the United Kingdom would translate the prophecy into fact. But the position in southern Asia is harder to assess. The considerable concentration of British power in the Near East cannot be dismissed from reckoning, but it is difficult to guess how long it can survive without access to supplies from the United Kingdom. Australia, which is today sending war materials to these forces, could not hope to supply them with their full requirements. Yet she would certainly feel it necessary to try, for many of her strategists call the Near East "Australia's frontier." If Britain's European enemies break through the Suez Canal into the Indian Ocean, they can join hands with Japan and quickly put an end to British, Dutch and French power in southern Asia. When British power vanishes there, Australia's position is frighteningly precarious. Even if India declares her independence fairly early in the game, and the position in French Indo-China appears doubtful, the British might feel it necessary to fight a delaying action around Suez.

There is the possibility, I think, that the surviving Near Eastern forces might then try to escape to Singapore and Australia. The objective in both cases would be to strengthen Australia. From the Singapore base,

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presuming it is available to the remnants of the British Mediterranean fleet, an effort could be made to defend the Netherlands Indies from a Japanese thrust. If these islands can be held, they will strengthen Australia by covering her northern frontier. Meanwhile the Australians will have strengthened themselves by tightening their grip on the British and French islands of the southern Pacific. The idea will be to prevent the use of them as bases for operations against the Australian mainland.

In the event of the collapse of the United Kingdom, Australia—and New Zealand, which goes along with her—will become an important focal point of British power. Even together, they will not at once become a strong unit, but the Australian continent and the islands of New Zealand have resources sufficient to support, at Western standards of living, several times as many people as now live there. If they can be retained, they will in time become great and important centers of the English-speaking world.

But the key to the British future cannot be found in the dominions of the southern Pacific. It is to be sought in North America. What happens in Canada and what the Americans decide to do will determine the issue, if once the United Kingdom is lost. Everyone who has speculated on this unhappy business has emphasized that Canada is the logical heir to British power. Winston Churchill was simply echoing lesser prophets when he selected the North American dominion as the base from which the British would continue the struggle should the United Kingdom fall. In such an event, the British Atlantic fleet will certainly cut and run for Canadian ports. Canada is by geography more nearly the center of the British world than the British Isles; it might be made the center of the British world in all respects. But it is highly doubtful if the British could win the current war from a Canadian base. It is highly unlikely, moreover, that the Americans would encourage them to try.

For the North American continent is an American responsibility. If the British launch attacks from it on Europe, they will provoke retaliation which, in turn, will inevitably draw the United States into the dispute. If the Americans take a hostile attitude toward the enterprise, it cannot be carried out. For to undertake it without actual or potential American aid would be to invite the destruction of Canada. What the American attitude will be depends, of course, on American policy toward the war. If the advocates of intervention have their way, then Churchill's dream may become a reality, for the fullest American help would be available. Otherwise Canada should be thought of as a British refuge and the headquarters of all salvaging operations. The British Isles, including Eire which, ironically enough, will share the United Kingdom's fate, might become *Britannia Irredenta*. In that case they would be an enormously troublesome factor in world politics.

It is almost inevitable that the British islands in the West Indies and the possessions in Central and South America will pass to the United States. (The only exception is the Falkland Islands, to which Argentina has long maintained a claim.) Whether this country will permanently retain them is another matter. Canada has a good claim to them. She could use a tropical economy to complement her exclusively temperate one. But in the beginning, defense of the United States will outweigh consideration for Canada's economic welfare.

American policy will also determine the ultimate fate of Australia and New Zealand. If the United States chooses in the future to back up with force her *status-quo* policy with regard to the Netherlands Indies, this will materially aid the Australians in maintaining their position, and also strengthen the worth of Singapore. If this country should extend the policy of *status quo* plus force to the British dominions of the South Pacific, then the Australians have a first-class chance of coming through with flying colors. In Harper's Magazine for May, 1940, I examined the bases upon which Australian and American Pacific policies might be coördinated. At that time the Australian newspapers were in no mood to discuss the matter rationally, preferring to bury their heads in the flag and cheer wildly for Britain as the eternal protector. Such an attitude, understandable when war fever is running high, can hardly survive the defeat of Britain. Already, as a result of the collapse of France, Australian sentiment is changing. Barring a few incredibly ardent chauvinists who would rather die than be beholden to the Americans, the Australians will accept American help in their extremity and be glad of it.

What leadership the dominions will accept from the United States after the salvaging operation is completed is difficult to guess. The neutrality policy of this country has damaged American prestige among Britishers. There is little appreciation among the commonalty of the significance of the aid-short-of-war interpretation of neutrality. The average Britisher will look askance at America as long as it stops short of full participation, including the sending of troops. If the United Kingdom goes under, there will be a strong disposition to blame the catastrophe on American "blindness and stupidity." British political and armaments policies of times past, industrial weakness in the United Kingdom and other peculiarly British deficiencies will be forgotten. The initial response to American aid in time of trouble will be one of grudging gratitude. Necessity may thereafter dictate that the British communities keep within the orbit of American power if they can. In this limited sense, America will lead. But Americans need expect no *spontaneous* gratitude or wholehearted acceptance of their leadership from the surviving British nations until the third or fourth generation.

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VII. Foreign Trade After the War

THERE IS NO ECONOMIC SUBJECT about which there exist more muddled ideas than international trade. And there is none in which practice has been further from the dictates of theory. Before we can begin to understand the trade situation which we shall face at the end of the war, it is well to survey briefly, in the light of theory, the facts of our present position.

If we speak of the interests of the nation as a whole, and in the broadest possible sense, there is no intrinsic advantage whatever in exporting anything. When we export, we send goods out of the country, and by that much diminish our common wealth. The only rational purpose of doing so is to get something in return which is of more value to us than that which we send out. If we could induce foreigners to ship us goods without accepting any in return, we should be that much better off. *The ultimate purpose of foreign trade, therefore, is to get from other nations as much as possible of what we want, and at the least sacrifice.* Or rather, it should be.

The classical theory of international trade is based on this unassailable premise. If trade is left unhampered by tariffs or other political impediments, the theory holds that peoples will sell abroad those things of which they have or can produce more than they need, buying in turn those things of which they have a scarcity. For, in a given country, goods which exist in excess of demand will be cheap, and goods which are demanded in excess of supply will be dear. Thus it will come about, under free trade, that there will be a natural division of labor on a worldwide scale, so that goods of each kind will be produced where they can be made most cheaply and abundantly. This is economically efficient, and will raise the standards of living everywhere.

There are certain important corollaries of this theory, such as that there must be unimpeded international movement of labor and capital, and a stable international medium of exchange. The approximation to the latter was supposed to be the international gold standard, with rates of exchange which, though allowed free fluctuation, would be approximately stable because gold would be shipped in payment of debts when the disparity between two given currencies, both based on gold, exceeded the cost of shipping the equivalent amount of precious metal.

The United States has almost never allowed this theory to operate freely. By our tariff policy we have usually tried to act as if the aim of trade were to sell as much abroad and buy as little as possible. This was done on the basis of the apparent interests of separate groups of producers who ignored their common interest as consumers.

For a good many years this policy worked fairly well in fact, but only because we did accept payment from abroad, in forms other than goods. We took foreign capital for our industries, we took shipping, insurance and banking services. Our export surplus of goods paid interest and profits on the capital, and paid for the cost of the services. It also was exchanged in part for the dollars spent by our tourists, and for those sent home by immigrants to their families. But when, with the First World War, we became a creditor nation, the whole basis of this procedure was knocked galley-west. For a time we concealed the worst effects by giving our export surplus away. We did this by the simple expedient of lending foreigners the credits with which to pay for it, thus creating debts which could not be repaid, and which in large part have gone bad. When the depression hit the world and we stopped lending, our exports were decimated.

At this point, our trade policy was revised by the New Deal. Secretary Hull tried to get the United States—and the world—to go back toward classical trade principles. The reciprocal trade treaties were instruments for reducing trade barriers, and so gradually accustoming this country to buying at least as much as, and possibly more than, it sold. It was the hope that in this readjustment our agriculture and manufacturing would not suffer even as producers, because the freeing of trade would increase the total volume all over the world. We might continue to sell as much as before, and buy more.

The United States, however, still has had surpluses. These consist chiefly of cotton, tobacco, wheat and other agricultural products. The continued existence of exportable surpluses without sufficient foreign markets has resulted from a number of factors: the growth of competing production in new countries at low cost, the attempt of European nations to increase self-sufficiency in food, even at high cost, the lack of purchasing power among our foreign customers, the fact that the United States itself buys relatively little abroad, the fact that it is difficult to shift the character of our agricultural production from things that are not wanted, and finally, the fact that our own industrial population has not had sufficient purchasing power to buy as much of the higher grades of food as it might consume.

There is, to be sure, a marked long-term downward trend in the exportable surpluses of our agricultural products; most of them are now unimportant in relation to the domestic consumption. Yet we have continued to have an export surplus, even under the reciprocal trade treaties. Again we have been giving our surplus goods away as under the Hoover regime: this time not for bad debts, but for gold, for which we have no better use than to bury it in Kentucky.

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World progress along the classical lines was immensely hampered by the new trade controls which proliferated abroad. Germany was the chief offender, and other nations were not far behind. But these controls have lately been used for a purpose precisely opposite to that for which our protective tariffs have been imposed. Germany had shortages of many things, and very few surpluses. She rigged her exchange and directed her foreign trade policy in order to buy as much as possible and pay as little as possible. She was helped in doing this because the depression had left so many nations with unsalable surpluses. She drove hard bargains by barter agreements, obtaining precious oil, iron and other raw materials in exchange for harmonicas and all sorts of manufactured products, many of which could neither be used nor sold by the nations receiving them. By brutally non-classical means she tried to effectuate the aim that acts as a premise for the classical theory—that the purpose of trade is to import what one needs. The only modifications of this purpose were made for the sake of political and military domination.

The war has merely put the capstone on this development. Germany's enemies have followed her example, while German methods have been spread as she has expanded. Even if Germany and Italy and the Soviet Union do not monopolize European trade after the war, there will not be a return to unregulated private enterprise, even in Britain. All Europe will have nationally controlled commerce. And the control will be exercised for two major purposes: first, to drive sharp bargains in buying; second, to prepare for conquest or resistance to conquest.

The inescapable conclusion is that all attempts to restore the practice of classical trade theories on our part are now so much self-deception. If we are either to serve the national economic interest or to protect ourselves from military aggression, we must have nationally controlled trade.

For what purposes must this control be exercised? First of all, of course, for acquiring those imports which we need. But these, however important they may be, are of relatively small value. We are even developing substitutes for many, so that in a pinch we could do without. Next, for obtaining considerations such as naval or air bases or good will or political coöperation. For the rest, we shall have to acknowledge that anything we export we are giving away, whether for gold that has only a possible value in some future time when, perchance, we may need to buy abroad more than we have for sale, or for worthless credits.

Basically, we are in an excellent trading position. Our needs for imports are fewer and less urgent than those of any other nation in the world. Our potential capacity for satisfying others' demands is enormous in almost every field of resources, foods, manufactures. But in order to realize in practice our basically good bargaining position we shall have to arrange our domestic economy so that we are not compelled to export unsalable surpluses. We shall have to be able to say to others: "Yes, we can send you what you want if you will let us have what we need, or if you will behave yourselves internationally. But we don't have to *give* it to you, because we can consume our surpluses here, and can avoid, without hardship, producing what we cannot consume."

At present we are in effect giving Britain military supplies. That is good national policy. We shall probably have to give others not only food but many other things before the war is over and after the peace. But let us remember that we are getting little of tangible value in return, and that we shall have to be prepared for a quick readjustment when the need for giving no longer exists. In order to do that, we must have not only our foreign trade but our internal economy under control.

The simplest of machinery for foreign-trade control is a governmental trading corporation holding a legal monopoly and including departments for the several branches of commerce—like Amtorg of the Soviet Union. This would act as agent for those desirous of importing and exporting, and would initiate planned trading policies of its own. It is more likely that this country would resort to a series of less inclusive agencies, of a sort with which we have had more experience. Crop surpluses, already largely in the hands of the Department of Agriculture, could be bartered, as they already have been, for needed materials like rubber and tin. A foreign trading authority could be set up to license other purchases and sales in accordance with national policy. Exchange control would aid. The Export-Import bank could play a leading role.

With such controls in existence, we should not have to worry so much about combating German economic influence in Latin America. This subject is discussed in another article. But the underlying fact is that from the Rio Grande south to the Platte, Latin America is normally dependent on us for the greater part both of exports and imports. Petroleum, fruit, minerals, coffee—we buy more from them than does the rest of the world. If, for political purposes, we want to buy more of Brazil's coffee surplus or Chile's copper than we can use ourselves, we should have little difficulty in doing so. Argentina is a separate problem, because she exports beef and wheat to Europe, as we do. We cannot consume those, but we should be in a better position if we could reduce or abolish our exportable surpluses. It seems to me that in trying to set up an ambitious Pan-American trading corporation we are beginning at the wrong end. Let's first have rational economic control in this country. Then the rest would be relatively easy.

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VIII. America in a Totalitarian World

READING "The Dynasts" the other day, I was struck by the vivid relevance for our own age of Thomas Hardy's phrase, "In a Time of the Breaking of Nations." Hardy wrote what he conceived to be a Homeric epic of the wars of Napoleon, from a perspective of almost a century. We today need no such long perspective to see that we are living similarly not only in a time of the dissolution of the accepted European order, but in a time of the passing of the sovereign nation-state and the transformation of economies and governments everywhere. We may have to wait long for the poets to celebrate (as from Stendhal to Hardy they celebrated Napoleon) the impact of the heroic-diabolic Hitler symbol upon the people's consciousness. But the political commentator cannot wait that long. Writing with an eye to action, he must measure the reach of world events upon the American mind and the American frame of government.

First of all, let us understand that we are now about to pay the reckoning we have so long postponed. That applies both in our foreign policy and in our internal affairs. If we had taken collective security seriously over the seven years that have elapsed since both Hitler and Roosevelt came to power, we would today have a different world. But that is now past, and neither recriminations nor assessments of blame will do us much good. We still use the phrase "if Hitler wins." We refuse to face the fact that he has already won, and that even a concerted effort now by Britain, Russia and the Americas—so necessary and so unlikely—would still leave him master of Continental Europe. Short of such an effort, we must reckon with a *pax Hitlerica* over the whole Western World such as will seek to strangle America and establish a fascist government here.

Two years ago I made a plea for a democratic collectivism in a book bearing the title, "It Is Later Than You Think." I was one of a group of writers stressing the urgency of economic reorganization to save democracy. Needless to say, we were ignored. And today the very people who all along scoffed at such a planned economy are the ones who are calling most loudly for military expenditures on so large a scale that only a collectivized economy could possibly meet the economic drain. We may now do under the stress of a military crisis what we should have done long ago under the conditions of peace. What was not done when it could have been done easily may have to be done now in haste, under conditions of danger and difficulty.[1]

[1] A detailed program for defense mobilization of the United States will be suggested in a subsequent article by Mr. Lerner.—THE EDITORS

My thesis is that the problem of national defense in America is inseparable from the problem of economic reorganization and governmental revision. Hitler's victory represents the triumph of military planning, welded to the functioning and the habits of a planned economy, in the service of a cause fervently believed in. Until the Churchill Cabinet came in, the British not only had not planned their war machine; they had not even begun to lay the foundation for such a war machine by an industrial plan. Their industrial life still followed the pattern of a planless corporate capitalism, with all that this implied for munitions, aviation, equipment, transport, military engineering. About the French, it would be too harrowing to make any comment.

Do we as Americans understand the full import of this? We keep debating whether we shall go to war or not, and in immediate terms it is an important question. But for the crucial question of our survival over the next decade, we are to all intents and purposes already at war. We are at war because survival dictates enormous military preparations carried out at a hitherto unheard-of speed. We are at war because this means a war economy and a war psychology, an enormous drain upon our national income which will inevitably come to a great extent from the standard of living of ordinary people. We are at war because a Hitler victory leaves us shorn of foreign markets, isolated economically and politically in a world in which the twin impulses of submission to a conquering power through fear and joining that power through bandwagon appeal will predominate. We are at war because we shall from now on have to carry on the democratic effort, heartbreaking at the very best, in the context of Nazi prestige and our own disenchantment.

There is no need for us to yield to this disenchantment with democracy; no need to overestimate Hitler's power. One thing at least we have gained: we know now what it is that we have to face, and such knowledge should prove the beginning of militancy. But this knowledge will be of little avail if we do not understand that all of our preparations for national defense must be an organic part of a wider economic plan, that any reorganization will not mean much unless it is part of a wider administrative reorganization, and that sacrifices by the people will be far less important in American survival than sacrifices by the present holders of economic power.

There are three paths open to us in the immediate future, and each of them will have its protagonists. One will be the attempt to build a massive military machine without making any essential economical or

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administrative changes, or any transfer of the locus of decision. So far as I can tell, that is the path implied in the utterances of every Republican candidate thus far (not excluding Mr. Willkie) and most of the Democratic candidates. It will masquerade under such slogans as "Preserve the Democratic Way" and "Do the Job Through a Business Man's Administration." It will mean, as it has always meant in the past, that the job of building and equipping an army, a navy and an air force will be ill done, done expensively, done with huge profits for a few and a great diminution of living standards for the many, done with the least effect upon unemployment and vested interests. It is hard to tell from the initial steps taken by the Roosevelt administration whether even it may not follow this plan, but sometimes I think so. I have as yet seen no recognition in this country of what the British have finally learned, although perhaps too late: that one cannot make up, even in military terms, for the lost time of the past and still have "business as usual."

The second path is that of a frank corporate and military dictatorship. It will not be called fascism, but it will be fascism nevertheless. If it comes at all, it is likely to come as the result of the panic following the collapse of the first method. It would use the international crisis as the occasion for setting up on American soil a home-built replica of the Nazi citadel. It would use all the slogans of Americanism, yet destroy completely the civil liberties, the rich cultural and religious divergences, the labor standards, the relative intellectual freedom of American life. It would be run by military men and business men in the service of what would start as a business dictatorship, but would become, as it did in Germany, an outright and cynical oligarchical control.

The third path I have called above a democratic collectivism. But, one may well say, do not the adjective and noun cancel each other out? I do not think so. The thesis that a democratic collectivism is contradictory in terms has in the past had the distinguished sponsorship of Walter Lippmann and Dorothy Thompson. I have been scanning the columns of both recently with great eagerness for some light on their present views of how America can revitalize the democratic dogma effectively, other than through their suggestions for coalition cabinets, the suppression of fifth columns and the suspension of party government. I am not speaking now of foreign policy, on which they have both had a good deal to say that has been always vigorous and generally valid. I refer to our domestic policy. Do they not know that administrative effectiveness, whether in England or America today, can be achieved only by a vast effort of planning and coördination, by the concentration of power in the hands of a small group of individuals, by a rigorous system of priorities and exclusions in the use of natural resources, by a drastic trenching upon the concepts of free corporate decisions and corporate profits?

I use Mr. Lippmann and Miss Thompson as symbols of the lag even among our liberals between international realism and internal realism. We are in the position of having to raise the national income, reemploy millions of people, turn out monstrous quantities of war supplies; and we are in the position of having to do this without scrapping the very things that alone can give our effort any meaning. To say that this cannot be done forces us back on one or the other of the two paths I described earlier. To say that it can be done means, unless we wish to hide our previous confusion behind words, an acceptance of the proposition that democracy is compatible with the socialization of industry and that democracy is also compatible with the concentration of governmental power.

But this does not mean that the task of making them march side by side is an easy one. I agree with Lewis Corey when he says that the lesson of the recent Soviet experience is to show us that socialism and dictatorship are also compatible. The task becomes, in other words, one of hammering out an economic plan which will integrate military with non-military uses of our resources and national income, which can combine administrative decentralization at the bottom with the concentration of power at the top, which can shift the locus of major decisions from the corporations to the government, and which will nevertheless be subject at crucial points to popular responsibility.

Let us not minimize the immediate costs. Labor rights will be endangered, civil liberties will suffer. On this subject I hope to continue the discussion in a later issue of The New Republic. Governmentally as well as economically, America is on the threshold of changes vaster than any since the Civil War, vaster even than in the first years of the New Deal. Today's textbooks on the national government may well sound rather archaic five years from now. If we enter on these changes with our eyes open, if we govern greatly and imaginatively, with the proper personnel, with the ultimate safeguards of congressional debate and the rule of law and the two-party system, we shall be able to keep our democracy and even strengthen it in the long run. Our real danger lies not in the dangers of a democratic collectivism. It lies in the chance that corporate tenacity and popular hysteria will prevent us even from making the attempt, and that again in Lloyd George's phrase, we shall have dared "too little and too late."

MAX LERNER

Here ends the special supplement on National Defense. It is worth noting that contributors to the supplement—whom we heartily thank for their collaboration—have in all cases expressed their own opinions. These do not necessarily agree with the editorial stand of The New Republic. – THE EDITORS

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Washington Notes

Maybe Man for a Maybe World

THERE HAS never been a national convention quite like the one here in Philadelphia. The Republican Party is supposed to be the instrument of the middle-class, the people who eat regularly. Their interests—together with those of the whole country—are being threatened by Hitler. How does the middle class propose to defend itself?

In the first few days of the convention, during the sessions of the resolutions committee, there was no sign that the rank-and-file delegates suspected danger existed. Here and there a leader knew—notably former Governor Landon—and showed himself as nervous as a horse that sees a shadow on the path ahead.

But in the first few days, the rank and file seemed chiefly concerned about the tariff. They were aghast that the leadership did not appear to think that Mr. Hull's reciprocal trade treaties would be an issue of the campaign. The lobby of the Bellevue-Stratford swirled with delegates muttering that the Easterners and Mr. Willkie were trying to turn the Republicans into a low-tariff party. They were not wearing McKinley badges but they might have been; the men who nominated McKinley forty years ago must have talked in the same way, lived in the same world.

Into this antique, museumlike atmosphere came the news that Colonels Stimson and Knox had accepted Mr. Roosevelt's invitation to enter his Cabinet. Their appointment must rank as one of the great strokes in experimental education of all time. The delegates learned that there was a war in Europe, that the country faced peril, that their own political and personal possessions were endangered.

The first reaction was anger, like that of a boy who is told to stay home from the movies and do his geometry. What was That Man's foreign policy, anyhow, and let's be against it. For the space of twelve hours, the Republican Party became frenetically pacifist. Doubt was expressed whether it would be advisable even to defend the Solid South and the Pacific Coast, since both regions are Democratic, let alone the Caribbean and South America.

Then the middle class settled down and adopted its policy. To all appearances, it will be precisely that of its counterparts in England and France a year ago. Before the resolutions committee and in adjoining hotel bedrooms, the responsible spokesmen of the Republican Party argued that no one could tell what might happen before next September, that maybe Hitler would conquer or wouldn't conquer, that maybe we wouldn't be touched, that to act or not to act would be chancy.

These Notes are written before the full convention has adopted the resolution committee's report, and before Mr. Hoover has spoken. In its present mood, the delegates will accept whatever Mr. Hoover says on foreign policy, if only, please, he won't ask to be nominated. But they want earnestly to do nothing.

The convention has also not yet voted on candidates. But however he fares, That Other Man, Mr. Willkie, has already established himself as an extraordinary person. On his arrival in Philadelphia, a crowd of some two or three hundred persons in the Bellevue-Stratford swarmed upon him. Innocent passers-by were caught in the onslaught; a resolute, red-faced, Far Western delegate cried: "How about the tariff?"

Mr. Willkie stopped dead. This correspondent, washed up in the lee of Mr. Willkie's shoulder, watched the old master moving into his act. As best he could, he spread his feet, balanced on his toes, like a fighter in a gymnasium, his pale blue eyes dancing to anticipate an opponent's sudden blow. He would answer the question, and repeated his familiar endorsement of the Hull treaties. From the edge of the crowd, infinitely distant, came the faint cries of the Willkie campaign staff, just realizing their precious charge was lost. Photographers shinned up distant pilasters, popping flashlights. Abashed by the attention he had drawn on himself, the red-faced delegate stubbornly yelled that Mr. Willkie was ducking, that he ought to answer yes or no.

The two men faced each other amid poundings, kickings, cuffings and strangled cries from the throng about them. Like an eel, Mr. Willkie whirled in his tracks. A man had somehow got his hand in Mr. Willkie's collar and was dully choking him. Mr. Willkie savagely rebuked him, squirmed around again, caught his red-faced interlocutor by the lapel and announced that we must talk this over. He jabbed the red-faced delegate repeatedly with his finger. His lecture went on, or seemed to go on, for fifteen minutes. Toward the end of it, the Willkie campaign assistants broke through; Mr. Willkie impatiently held them back. He traced the policy of reciprocal tariffs back to James G. Blaine; it was sound Republicanism. He expatiated on the Canadian tariff treaty negotiated by William Howard Taft. As he told of the immense trade difficulties that would confront America at the end of the present war, the red-faced delegate screamed above the noise: "I'm for you personally, Mr. Willkie, only I'm high-tariff." It is unlikely that any other presidential candidate would have wanted to put on such a show, but certainly no other could have managed it.

In other circumstances, Mr. John L. Lewis' frank offer to enter into a deal with the Republicans, made before the resolutions committee, might have been regarded as a justifiable maneuver. When Mr. Lewis first broke with Mr. Roosevelt, more than a year ago, it was predicted in these Notes that he would attempt to gain a balance-of-power position between the two major parties, and I recited the advantages to labor that such a course might bring. But the labor movement, together with the whole country, has entered a new, changed period. By naming Mr. Sidney Hillman a member of the Defense Council's Advisory Committee, Mr. Roosevelt has at least partially atoned for whatever slights he may previously have visited on the CIO. Mr. Lewis' actions at Philadelphia seem to have contributed toward the resignation of Mr. Eli Oliver, director of Labor's Non-Partisan League since its inception. From close observation, this department would like to testify to Mr. Oliver's immense energy, enthusiasm, loyalty. Mr. Lewis' policy is causing strains within the CIO that may prove intolerable.

Philadelphia

T. R. B.

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Other People's Money

Billions for What?

I WONDER if the average American who reads the newspapers has got hold of the fact that in the last month our government in Washington has proposed a program of military and naval expansion which involves an expenditure of $11,000,000,000.

The news of new appropriations, new ship and plane programs, new army equipment and the billions needed for them have come along day by day with such dizzying swiftness that it has left not only the man in the street but the fellow at the newspaper copy desk utterly bewildered.

May 2 is only six weeks from the point in time at which I write. Yet on that day the President said: "With nearly $2,000,000,000 already provided for defense forces, the nation's productive capacity is being taxed to capacity in most industries so that an immediate outlay of additional money would not be reflected in a corresponding outlay in material."

Also he laid emphasis, to quote The New York Times: "That there was no cause for alarm in reports of the efficiency of offensive weapons being used in the European war." The Germans had overrun Denmark and Norway and dusted the British out of Norway.

But as the Germans marched into Belgium the whole scene changed. No new weapons had been revealed by Germany. What had changed was the identity of the victims. The Low Countries were overrun, England and France were in real danger. And the President talked about another $500,000,000 for defense. But when he got around to addressing Congress on May 17, he asked for $1,823,000,000. At this point the account stood as follows. In his January budget message the President had requested $1,823,000,000 for national defense. With this new request the total came to roughly $3,000,000,000. This was the occasion upon which he talked about an immediate plan for 50,000 planes and thereafter 50,000 planes a year, or at least capacity for that. When all these requests were reduced to bills and passed the total was $3,282,000,000.

But this was merely a beginning. By the end of May, after the British were driven from France, the President asked for another billion. It is a little difficult to follow the mazes of this swift railroading of bills, but by June 13 this request was passed through the House—to the tune of $1,706,000,000—bringing the total up to $4,988,000,000.

Before this was enacted into law a new bill on June 18 was introduced by Representative Vinson for $1,200,000,000 for 84 additional ships. Vinson is chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee and works in close collaboration with the President. One might suppose this represented a carefully considered plan of the government. However, on the very next day this bill was scrapped in Vinson's committee in favor of a new one for $4,000,000,000, after hearing Admiral Stark. This has not been passed, but it was approved by the committee and sent to the House the day it was offered. This brought the total up to $8,988,000,000, though of course the four-billion-dollar bill has not yet been passed by Congress.

But before the ink was dry on this bill, a new proposal appeared for $3,000,000,000 additional for the army. This arrived June 20. What it is for precisely it is not possible to say as I write this. But if this goes through, the whole program—as far as we can see—will be $11,988,000,000—let us say $12,000,000,000.

Now it is difficult to put together all the separate pieces of this proposed and passed legislation and it is entirely possible that, as bill has followed bill, some duplication has occurred, so that this estimate may be out as much as a billion. I have checked through the newspaper accounts as carefully as possible, but it is impossible to eliminate all the duplications. An error of a billion here would reduce these estimates to the comparatively minor sum of $11,000,000,000.

Moreover, so far as I can judge, this does not envisage the creation of that great host of two million men—and women—in our contemplated armies of the gun and the shovel. This contemplates a small force of 450,000 men in the army now and 750,000 in 1941. The figures doubtless would have to be revised upward if our great legions of compulsory universal military and industrial servitude are raised.

We need not wonder that Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson, who has been crying from the housetops for soldiers to keep Hitler away, should find himself in a state of lyrical exultation. "We are quite definitely approaching the moment when through money—profits—spent by American industry the United States Army and Navy are going to be able to reach up into the sky and reach their target," he cried. At least the appropriations are going to reach up into the sky. And, so far as we can see, it is out of the sky that the money for these great armaments is to be obtained.

The fact that we cannot build any important part of these armaments for years to come—heaven knows how many—does not seem to make any difference to the warriors. At least one thing they see—and they have said so frankly—the profits from this great new industry, the war industry, are going to travel through every level of American economic life and make dividends for our investors and wages for our hardy workers, whose number, by the way, will be reduced by two millions through their absorption into our draft armies. And there, praise be the God of Hosts! they will be protected from those isms which float in and out of young men's minds when they read the wrong books and magazines and find themselves encouraged to think. At least this is one of the advantages of this great draft army which the President assures us we can count on.

I have been taken to task almost weekly for my fears of the coming of militarism. And yet, methinks, it is here—and something worse: Militarism plus shovel armies. I feel sure I can rely on all my ardent liberal readers to gather around our great leader and cheer him on in this newest of our great liberal advances.

JOHN T. FLYNN

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On the Records

THERE IS SOMETHING rather extraordinary in the picture of Adolf Busch with a violin in his hand, a handkerchief under his chin, and an audience in front of him. His face, under a mat of yellow hair, is broad and, after he has been playing for several minutes, becomes quite red. His hands seem big for his fiddle, and he looks around at the audience as though he did not like the idea a bit. When he plays, he plays without brilliance, but with a rare and sensitive feeling for what is and what is not good taste, and sometimes with a tenderness that you would not expect from such an ox of a man. You may notice that he has a way of sliding around from one position on the fingerboard to another, at times, and that occasionally his intonation is faulty on passing notes, as though his mind had impatiently gone on ahead to some more important note or phrase upon which he will land properly and at the right moment. But there is a forthright honesty and sincerity about him that somehow seem to overshadow these minor flaws.

So you can listen to Busch's string quartet playing Schubert's Quartet Number 8 in B-Flat (Victor M-670, 6 sides; $6.50) without being too disturbed by Busch's not-quite-on-it-in-spots tone. The performance is better than it sounds—better, that is, than it sounds the first time. What the boys don't give you in one way, they give you in another, in their precision, the feeling with which they play the tragic chords of the slow movement, or in the sharp skipping staccato passages of the presto. This performance is of some value because the work is not often played, and the same holds true for the Mozart Piano Concerto Number 14 in E-Flat (K. 449) in which Busch leads his chamber players while his son-in-law, Rudolf Serkin, plays the piano (Victor M-657, 6 sides; $6.50). There is considerable of Mozart's charm and not a little of his sadness in this work, and Serkin brings it out clearly and beautifully. The accompaniment now and then seems a little feeble, as though Busch were seated too far from the microphone, or felt slighted and didn't want to play; but it's good.

In Victor's recent issue of Mozart's great Requiem (M-649, 12 sides; $12) you can find much of the profound and moving beauty you would expect of the composer's last work—the Requiem which, partly composed on his deathbed and finished by others, turned out to be his own. You can find it, that is, if you are patient. The performance of the University of Pennsylvania Choral Society and the Philadelphia Orchestra, presided over by Harl MacDonald, is good in some spots but only fair in others. There is no getting around the fact that the unnamed soloists are poor in quality, the baritone lacking range, the soprano and contralto a decent sense of pitch. But you can weed out the bad spots, with a little patience. You will probably want to skip the Recordare, where the soloists are at their awful worst, Tuba Mirum, and perhaps some of Domine Jesu Christe or Hostias. That accomplished, Mozart's dying message is there, and can be found. You will find it first in the opening chorus with its somber introduction and beautiful closing chords, which are to recur as a prayer at various times later—so curiously like Bach or Palestrina. You may find it in the fugue, Christe Eleison (also like Bach) which is repeated again at the very end, or in the stronger choruses such as Rex Tremendae, and the Sanctus, Benedictus and Agnus Dei, although it is still not certain how much of these last three Mozart actually wrote. It is certainly to be found in the poignant grief of Lacrymosa, and in the deep solemn cadences ("As thou to Abraham and his children promised in ages past") in which the broad smooth tones of the Philadelphia's trombone choir spread out over the chorus with a sort of slow majesty and then die away, having left the feeling that a voice from another world has spoken, and all questions have been answered.

While we're still on Mozart, you will probably want to hear Yehudi Menuhin playing the Allegro from the Sonata in G Major (K 301) with his sister Hephzibah at the piano, and the Andante from the B-Flat Sonata (K. 378) with his sister Yaltah. Both are beautifully performed, given an individual twist by Menuhin's own peculiar tone, and are contained on a single record (Victor 16106; $2).

There are a number of other singles around which should not be overlooked. On one, Edouard Commette, organist at the Cathedral of Saint-Jean, in Lyon, is to be heard in a well played and well recorded performance of two Bach organ pieces, the meditative Andante from the Italian Concerto, and the stirring chorale prelude, Wachet Auf, Ruf't Uns die Stimme (Columbia 69875-D; $1.50). On another, Ernest Victor Wolff plays Haydn's Andante Con Variazioni in F Minor, and plays it beautifully, but you had better listen to it before buying—my copy has a bad waver on the second side (Columbia 69876-D; $1.50). Wolff is also to be heard as harpsichordist in Handel's G Minor Sonata (Opus 5, No. 5) with Eddy Brown and Ramon Totenberg, violinists (Royale 603; $1). I've never gone in very much for Debussy as you find him in such piano pieces as Pagodes, or L'Ile Joyeuse, which may have excited Paris when augmented triads and the whole-tone scale still hinted at the strange, the thrilling, the daring (my card, Monsieur). But if you like it, you will surely like Gieseking's crisp, cool performance of the former, and his capable playing of the latter (Columbia 69841-D; $1.50).

I don't know why, but the two-piano records are still coming off the stamper, unabated and unabashed. One rather unsatisfactory recording of three Brahms waltzes and the Romance from Arensky's Suite for Two Pianos, played by Herzer and Zayde, has been out for some months under the Royale label (1825, one 10-inch record; 75 cents). The performance is good enough, but the recording is not. Darius Milhaud's Scaramouche, for two pianos, seems to be enjoying a minor boom, and is now to be had in two versions. That of Vronsky and Babin (Victor 1276; $1.50) is somewhat sharper than that of Bartlett and Robertson (Columbia; $1.50) and possibly comes closer to the composer's intentions, but I wouldn't say it's any better. You can also hear Bartlett and Robertson in transcriptions of Bach's Sheep May Safely Graze, from the Birthday Cantata, and the Arrival of the Queen of Sheba, from Handel's Solomon (Columbia 69818-D; $1.50). The Bach is effective enough when the shepherd's pipes are taken by flute stops on an organ, but a bit monotonous on two pianos. The Handel, shorn of trumpet fanfares and drums, sounds tinny.

STANLEY FERGUSON

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The Bandwagon

The Westchester Cat Club formed a committee to investigate and make recommendations on what steps should be taken to safeguard the lives of cats in the event of a foreign invasion.

Mrs. John S. Hunter, of Mount Vernon, is leader of the committee. Plans for the evacuation of cats to safety zones and the establishment of cat registries and first-aid stations in the event of enemy air raids were discussed. – *News item from Scarsdale, N. Y., to The New York Herald Tribune.*

The character of the American funeral truly reflects the American standard of living. – *L. Porter Ray, newly elected president of the Funeral Directors' Association of Kentucky, quoted in The Louisville Courier Journal.*

Although it may be a slight anachronism to say that the corset was revived with the war, there is no doubt that the one trade which has vastly expanded in Britain since last September is that of corsetry, affirms the fashion editor of The Observer of London, and continues:

"The greater the difficulties ahead, the more women feel that they should fortify themselves with the support not of the light elastic belts of peacetime, but with corsets which really control the figure." – *News item in The New York Times.*

Better Not Be

. . . Quite the prettiest things at the moment are, incredibly, the gas masks for the tiny children between two and five. The boxes are one color, the little gas masks another; it was thought that they would appeal to the children more that way. The tiny children adore them and won't be parted from them at any price. – *News note in Harper's Bazaar.*

What Key?

Piano player who can play old-time songs and two waitresses. Dinty Moore's tavern. – *Ad in The Maywood (Ill.) Herald.*

I Love the (Birnam) Woods!

Sterile and unproductive, regiments of Pussytoes *Antennaria plantaginifolia* take possession of mounds and sidehills. It pussyfoots beside cowpaths and surrounds sleeping ledges as an army tries to envelop its enemy. It is communistic, living in patches and multiplying by slim prostrate branches which root and start new plants. Many communistic weeds pussyfoot into good farm land when it is neglected, just as alien subversive forces pussyfoot into a country when its people begin to forget patriotism. When a farmer pussyfoots in the upkeep of his soil sensitive ferns, sheep sorrel and *Antennaria plantaginifolia*, or *A. neodioica*, are apt to steal soft-footed into his fields. When people of a democracy pussyfoot, do not commit themselves for 100 percent democracy, all sorts of political weeds and noxious philosophies come pussyfooting in. – *J. Otis Swift in The New York World-Telegram.*

The Double Standard

The new Gem Theatre in Villa Grove will open to the public on Thursday night. The new Gem is built modern throughout, both ladies' and men's rest rooms. – *News item in The Villa Grove (Ill.) News.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. – THE EDITORS

Correspondence

A Bogie Under Every Bed

SIR: I'm not certain as to just what a "sixth column" would be, but I can visualize one being created in this country by hysterical groups and confused individuals looking for "subversive elements" and "fifth column" enemies. It is true that we have in this country many real enemies of the state, but it is hardly possible for the average citizen to be able to recognize or identify such enemies accurately.

In such a crisis as we are approaching, the person who can keep a cool head and go about his business with the least possible disturbance to others will be of greater help to the law-enforcement and defense agencies of the country than those who see their patriotic "duty" in furthering the excitement and confusion that naturally accompany a war emergency. He can even play at being soldier by harmless parade, guarding bridges, culverts and crossroads on Sunday afternoons as he did in 1917—so long as he doesn't assume undue authority and become part of a degenerate, lawless mob as many of them did in '17.

I sincerely hope that The New Republic will oppose any and every effort at creating "defense units," "viligance groups" or "home-defense companies" except those under trained and competent direction of military authorities and law-enforcement officers. We can make our country strong by working together and in coöperation, not by fighting among ourselves and taking advantage of fear and hysteria for furthering our own selfish ends and ambitions.

Mamaroneck, N. Y. MAURICE H. REID

The Glascock Poetry Award

SIR: The winner of the Kathryn Irene Glascock Award ($100) has just been announced by its sponsors in the English Department at Mount Holyoke College. This yearly event, which has never asked or received any publicity, seems to me of considerable significance.

The fund for the prize was established jointly by Colonel Hugh Glascock, in memory of his talented daughter, and by The Mount Holyoke News, of which she was editor. Less a contest than a meeting, the Glascock Award has brought together boys and girls from different colleges each May for seventeen years, to read from their own verse before a small audience in Leonard Bacon, William Rose Benét, Louise Bogan, Anna South Hadley, Massachusetts. Among the judges have been Hempstead Branch, Witter Bynner, Henry Seidel Canby, Robert Frost, John Livingston Lowes, Marianne Moore, Genevieve Taggard.

This year's winner, George Zabriskie of Duke University, wrote with a strange mixture of objectivity and passion about a mill district in a college town. He offered no glib, dogmatic solution for the waste in the lives he pictured—only a deeply troubled penetration into a group of people:

> Learning in strange hypnotic dreams to hold themselves
> From joy or tragedy, like insects dulled by winter.

Their subject matter was varied, but all of the contestants showed a seriousness about their craft which belied Mr. Conrad

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Aiken's theories about the "cult of artlessness." In fact, has Mr. Aiken not turned poetic intention hind-part-before? In the rejection of shopworn metrics, grandiloquence borrowed from another time, once-brave words with all the nap rubbed off, young poets today are perhaps more concerned with "form" than was a more docile generation of writers. They must search harder than ever for freshly evocative images, and even for a new and condensed rhetoric to whet their thinking and to sidestep verbosity.

As The New Republic has published several Glascock contestants in recent years (Kimball Flaccus, Martha Keller, Samuel French Morse, Muriel Rukeyser, Winfield Townley Scott and myself), it occurred to me that you might be especially interested in a meeting which also gave impetus to their early efforts.

New Haven, Conn. VIRGINIA HAMILTON

The Beam in Our Own Eye

SIR: Referring to the editorial paragraph in your May 6 issue and other material indicating that you cannot approve of the French treatment of refugees, especially Spanish, would you provide me with the figures showing how many refugees, especially Spanish, *you* have taken? Also, any information concerning their treatment and their proportion in numbers to your population would assist me in removing any lack of humble-minded gratefulness for United States criticisms which may appear here.

Agréez, chers messieurs, l'assurance de mes sentiments les plus équivoques.

London, Eng. RAYMOND POSTGATE

The Entering Wedge

SIR: On Sunday, June 16, the owner of The Chicago Tribune, Colonel R. McCormick, gave a nationwide address over the Mutual Broadcasting System, in which he pointedly accused Léon Blum as alone being responsible for the industrial unpreparedness of the French nation, and, therefore, of being solely to blame for the calamitous state of affairs now existing in France.

It seems to me that this injudicious attack against Blum was made because Mr. McCormick seeks a scapegoat for the tragic fate of France and, knowing that the public is more easily swayed by accusations against persons than by principles, finds it appropriate to fasten the blame on a man who is Jewish and a Socialist to boot.

It is most likely that Mr. McCormick in attacking Blum really meant to suggest to his listeners that the Jews were responsible for the defeat of France and that a similar fate awaits the American people unless we dismiss those men of Jewish extraction who are in responsible government positions.

The end of democratic government in this country is a certainty if we permit any minority to be persecuted for the sake of men like Mr. McCormick.

Chicago, Ill. STUART BRENT

MacLeish on War, Con'td.

SIR: Mr. Archibald MacLeish, in his speech "Post-war Writers and Pre-war Readers" which was printed in The New Republic for June 10, expresses concern over the fact that the young generation takes an improper attitude toward the "contemporary crisis." May one member of the young generation be permitted to express concern over the fact that Mr. MacLeish should expect to find any other attitude?

Maybe the young "distrust all statements of principle and conviction" because they recall too vividly how the meaning of these statements is made to change with the times, depending upon what men want to prove with them. I think that we believe in liberty and freedom and democracy just as sincerely and fervidly as Mr. MacLeish does, but I think that we bitterly resent and scoff at the cowardly thinking which uses these noble concepts as a blind for going to war.

If we want to fight, let's be honest about our reasons, whatever they are. Then we won't have to explain to the next generation why we did not get what we were fighting for.

New York City MEREDITH BLOSS

SIR: From my experience with college youth I know that Mr. MacLeish is not mistaken when he finds much arbitrary rejection of most moral values among intelligent young men and women. But I vigorously question his assumption that their only decent alternative is militant support of the Allies. The young people I know have an immense moral certainty when it comes to advocating an extension of relief, public works and the vote. They have no doubt that freedom of speech and press is morally valuable. And they are morally certain that fascism is domestic as well as international.

Mr. MacLeish has raised a false problem. The implied process of arriving at it may be bluntly stated as follows: Youth has abandoned many old beliefs. It even dares to disbelieve what MacLeish believes. Youth is, therefore, impossibly semantic, skeptical and immoral. But is it possible that youth is right and MacLeish wrong?

New York City RUSSELL AMES

Too Late?

SIR: In the name of common humanity certainly the United States should respond to the Allies' call for help. I suggest, therefore, that we follow Chamberlain's policy in Spain and send a committee of neutral observers to France to find out whether or not that country is being invaded by Germans.

New York City ARGUS

From The New Republic Mail Bag

E. N. Muller Jr. of Wycoming, Pennsylvania, sends appreciation for Max Lerner's review of the Beard and Buell books (June 3). The reference to Nazism as "the expression of manifold revolutionary disturbances all over the world" is a truth that "has scarcely even been hinted at," and Mr. Muller hopes Mr. Lerner will develop it more fully some time. . . . Carolyn P. Walker of Simsbury, Connecticut, sends "many thanks for your splendid editorial, "The Way to Help the Allies" (June 17), and applauds us for admitting past mistakes.

Second-Class Letterbox. – The Spanish Refugee Relief Campaign wants to remind us that among the millions of refugees now in France are 5,000 Spanish children who will be shipped home if their support cannot be guaranteed by Americans. Funds go to 381 Fourth Avenue, New York City. . . . The Foreign Language Information Service has changed its name to the Common Council for American Unity, and writes to remind us of the increased need for its work, now that Americans of German and Italian extraction are in for a bad time of suspicion, misunderstanding, discrimination. The Council's object is to promote understanding, breaking down regional, racial, linguistic barriers. Its offices are at 22 Fourth Avenue, New York City. . . . Mrs. Martha A. A. Beer, the mother and executrix of the late Thomas Beer, is compiling material on his life—letters, recollections, documents, etc.—and requests that any having such material send it to her at 133 West Eleventh Street, New York City. Careful handling and prompt return are promised.

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Archibald MacLeish and "the Word"

MR. ARCHIBALD MACLEISH, in his new role of the Librarian of Congress, has suddenly taken a turn which must be astonishing even to those who have followed his previous career.

In a speech before the American Association for Adult Education, which has been prominently reported in the newspapers and printed by The New Republic in its issue of June 10, he has declared that the war novels of such writers as John Dos Passos and Ernest Hemingway (to name only the Americans mentioned), in their railing against "the statements of conviction, of purpose and of belief on which the war of 1914-18 was fought," have left the younger generation "defenseless against an enemy whose cynicism, whose brutality and whose stated intention to enslave present the issue of the future in moral terms—in terms of conviction and belief." Without, says Mr. MacLeish, attempting "to judge these writers," and confessing that he himself at one time indulged a similar impulse, he sternly insists that Dos Passos, Hemingway and Company "must face the fact that the books they wrote in the years just after the War have done more to disarm democracy in the face of fascism than any other single influence."

In the first place, it is obviously absurd for Mr. MacLeish to cite, as he does, two passages describing the feelings of characters in novels by Dos Passos and Hemingway as evidence of the authors' own lack of convictions or of a tendency of their books to "disarm democracy." If anything could be plain to a reader of Dos Passos, it is the fact that moral principles play a more serious part in his work than in that of almost any other important American novelist and that his sympathies are passionately democratic. And if anything could be plain to a reader of Hemingway, it is the fact that he is constantly preoccupied with ideals of gallantry and honor and pugnacious almost to the point of madness. Neither Dos Passos nor Henri Barbusse, also cited by Mr. MacLeish, has ever asserted or believed, as Mr. MacLeish declares they have, "that nothing men can put into words is worth fighting for"; but the conflict in which Dos Passos and Barbusse were interested during the years after World War I was the fight on the labor front. One of the first things that Barbusse did after the War was to publish an intransigent radical tract called "Le Couteau entre les Dents," which was certainly a "statement of conviction, of purpose and of belief," if any has ever existed. Barbusse became a militant Left journalist and remained one up to his death. But Mr. MacLeish, who is now so keen about fighting, takes no account of this kind of militancy. He sounds as if he had never heard of the class war, which has certainly, since the Bolshevist revolution, presented itself as the fundamental conflict of the contemporary world. Nor can the writers whom Mr. MacLeish mentions be accused, in this case, of having failed to take fighting political slogans seriously: Henri Barbusse, for example, erred in the other direction—by not being critical enough.

It is true that the books of these writers did give voice to a certain disillusionment with the cause of the Allies in the last war as a struggle for "justice and humanity," as an effort to "save democracy." But it would be necessary for Mr. MacLeish, if he wants to discount what they said, to expound his own view of the last war. Should not the Allies have put an end to it in January, 1916, by concluding a peace with Austria at the time of the Austrian peace offers? Should the United States have ever gone into it? Did we do anything except prolong it unnecessarily and leave the situation worse than it would otherwise have been? Would not the belligerent nations have made an earlier peace, on a basis less dangerous for the world—for has it not been precisely the situation of Germany, as she was left by the Allies after their victory, humiliated, dismembered, crushed, mortgaged for generations with an indemnity, that has given Hitler his fatal opportunity to figure as a national savior? Did not Wilson, with his enthusiasm for the rights of small nations, derived from the tradition of the Confederacy, simply play into the hands of the Allied statesmen, who wanted to break up Central Europe in order to weaken it and who left it a prey to the first adventurer with the nerve to put it together again? Were there not, in short, very good reasons why anyone who had served in the last war should have considered the Allied slogans an imposture? Mr. MacLeish does concede that the novelists in question were only dramatizing in their fiction "what all of us who were in the war believed." "But," he adds, "they are nevertheless words which have borne bitter and dangerous fruit."

Why? Can it really be admitted that the reading of these novels about the War has been the cause of the more general skepticism which seems to be current today about the value for either ourselves or Europe of the United States' engaging in foreign wars? This skepticism, the skepticism, say, of Charles A. Beard, is surely not the result—save, perhaps, to a minor degree—of the impression made by disillusioned novels; it is the result of the same natural causes which also produced the novels and which were as much historical realities at the moment of Mr. MacLeish's writing as they were the morning after the Versailles Treaty.

But now we come to another point which Mr. MacLeish seems to be trying to make in this extraordinarily confused piece. He seems to have some idea that writers should censor themselves in the interests of—it is not clear what; in the interests of some extremely vague idea of what is necessary to "defend ourselves against fascism." This is the author of that poem on "The Social Muse," which appeared only a few years ago in the pages of this same magazine—that poem in which Mr. MacLeish depicted the ignominious end of writers who went in for causes, and declared that the role of the poet was that of the woman who follows the armies and sleeps with the soldiers of both camps. (*"It is also strictly forbidden to mix in maneuvers. . . . Is it just to demand of us also to bear arms?"*) But it will surprise no one at this time of day to call attention to the fact that Mr. MacLeish has repudiated an earlier position. He has in the course of his career struck a greater variety of attitudes and

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been ready to repudiate them faster than perhaps any other writer of our time; and he says expressly in the piece under consideration that he himself has sinned in the past as Hemingway and Dos Passos have sinned. But at last he has been forced to recognize that "perhaps the luxury of the complete confession, the uttermost despair, the farthest doubt should be denied themselves by writers living in any but the most orderly and settled times." Well, you will not find the farthest doubt or the uttermost despair in the writers whom Mr. MacLeish mentions; they all believe pretty strongly in something. But even if you did, as you do find them in certain other writers, should efforts really be made to dissuade them, as Mr. MacLeish would dissuade them, from truthfully expressing themselves?

I cannot see how any person to whom literature was even for a moment real could have written the sentence I have quoted. The farthest doubt and the uttermost despair are, of course, not "luxuries" at all to anyone except a literary "irresponsible," who feels that he can choose his moods, as if they were suits from a well stocked wardrobe. They are the expressions of the bewilderment or the bitterness wrung from the human spirit by precisely those periods of history which are the reverse of orderly and settled. One would like to ask Mr. MacLeish whether he believes that the dignity of this spirit was lowered by the skepticism of Montaigne or the despair of the romantic poets, or that any useful end for civilization would have been served by their suppressing what they thought and felt.

But the most remarkable statement in Mr. MacLeish's speech just precedes that which I have quoted. "Perhaps writers," he says, "having so great a responsibility to the future, must not weaken the validity of the Word even when the deceptions of the Word have injured them." That is, if you have ever suffered from falling a victim to somebody or other's phony propaganda, you should not expose it, but let it go on duping others, for fear of destroying the integrity of "the Word." It is exactly as if a banker were to consider it against his interests to warn the authorities that there was counterfeit money abroad. Mr. MacLeish quotes a statement by John Chamberlain to the effect that the younger generation "distrusts not only slogans and all tags, but even all words—distrusts, that is to say, all statements of principle and conviction, all declarations of moral purpose." Mr. MacLeish's alternative, apparently, is that we should believe in all these declarations. Otherwise, we shall impair "the Word." Words, for Mr. MacLeish, are thus evidently ends in themselves—not a technique for understanding, a medium for putting on record the realities of human experience, a medium and a technique which must constantly be renewed to meet the requirements of changing experience. The truth is that when the new words come in, the old must be put away; and it is one of the primary duties of the writer to avoid using outworn words that no longer have any real meaning. It is difficult to see how a writer for whom words had ever had a real meaning could talk as Mr. MacLeish does here.

And now let us ask again: in the interests of precisely what has Mr. MacLeish thought it proper at this time to denounce as "disastrous" and "dangerous" the influence of a number of writers whom he characterizes as "honest men," among "the best and most sensitive of my genera-

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tion"? Mr. MacLeish does not tell us precisely; but the whole tone of his speech sounds rather ominously as if he might be trying to prepare us for a new set of political slogans, of "declarations of moral purposes" to be let loose from the same official sources that launched the publicity of World War I. Mr. MacLeish is now an official himself; and he seems a little uneasy as to whether the utterances of officials will everywhere be taken quite seriously. It may be that he remembers that in the company he sometimes kept before he removed to Washington—*"Dos who saw the tyrants in the lime, Ernest that saw the first snow in the fox's feather . . . O living men . . . receive me among you!"* —such utterances were not always well received; and that he wants now to dissociate himself from that company.

Mr. MacLeish is at pains to tell us that he does not want to burn any books or to regiment people's minds; but it does not create reassurance, at this moment of strain and excitement, to hear the Librarian of Congress talking about "dangerous" books. He has a good deal to say about liberty in the latter part of his speech, but he makes it plain that he thinks certain kinds of writers should be discouraged from giving expression to certain kinds of ideas.

There is one point in Mr. MacLeish's declaration which raises it to a height of absurdity which almost disarms criticism. In his list of deleterious authors, he includes Erich Maria Remarque, the author of "All Quiet on the Western Front," and Andreas Latzko, the author of "Men in War." Mr. MacLeish appears to have forgotten that Latzko and Remarque, after all, had been fighting during the War for "statements of conviction" and "declarations of moral purpose" on the opposite side from those of the Allies. Mr. MacLeish really ought to be in favor of there having been more Remarques and Latzkos to demoralize the German side. As a matter of fact, the moving picture made from "All Quiet on the Western Front" was violently attacked by the Nazis, who feared its effect on the public. If Latzko and Remarque had really been influential, the Nazis would not now be in France. If this school of writers in general had had the importance which Mr. MacLeish assigns to them, we should have no World War Number II to worry about.

EDMUND WILSON

Books in Review

Europe, Incorporated

THE ADVANTAGES of American federalism are often cited: a great continental free-trade area, a single currency, no need for a huge standing army, and a Supreme Court which presumably guarantees the citizen of each federated state a "republican" form of government. Nearly all the proponents of a world federation (Rosika Schwimmer), a federation of the Atlantic democracies (Clarence Streit) or a federation for western Europe (see W. I. Jennings' book of that title, listed below[1]), have built their ideological structures on the example of the United States; and never since Americans were first reading the Federalist papers have the ideas of our Founding Fathers been so vigorously debated. The Clarence Streit plan has been criticized (by Peter Drucker, among others) as being too "legalistic"; it has also been condemned as a pious front for an alliance of the west against all the more "dynamic" countries between the Rhine and the Marshall Islands. The other plans—those for world federation or West European federation—do not discriminate against Germany; but they certainly discount the tensions and cholers of 1940 to a Utopian degree.

In his proposals for "The United States of Europe,"[2] the politely iconoclastic Alfred Bingham recognizes all the difficulties that confront the Streit-Schwimmer-Jennings school of unionists who go to the Philadelphia of 1787 for inspiration. Indeed, Mr. Bingham performs the incredibly startling trick of outlining plans for a European federation that would depend on virtually none of the Madison-Hamilton principles. Mr. Bingham accepts interstate tariffs (for a time, at least); he also accepts (and glorifies) the socially responsible cartel. His union would have both local currencies and a federal currency (a nice stunt if you can suspend Gresham's law); and the various constituent states would be allowed to keep their own local governments, whether democratic or totalitarian. A preponderance of the military force would, of course, be under the control of the federal authorities; and the arms business would no longer be a private concern of Vickers, Krupp and Schneider-Creusot.

If John T. Flynn reads Mr. Bingham his hair will stand on end. For what Mr. Bingham is suggesting is a super-NRA for the continent of Europe. His industries (an adaptation of the present cartel system) will be organized in vast international trade associations; his labor unions affiliated with an International Labor Office which is already in existence, will likewise cut across political boundaries; the investor will be protected by various devices (such as pricing policies that will allow an adequate return on cartel capital); and finally the consumer will get his modicum of representation by an extension of the coöperative movement. Mr. Bingham's prime virtue as a realist is that he tries to build on institutions that already exist; certainly we *have* cartels, labor unions and consumer coöperatives, and the administrative capacities and techniques needed in Mr. Bingham's world are therefore partly in existence already.

Mr. Bingham may very well be describing the Europe of the future. But it is not a world which the author of this review is going to spend any blood and tears trying to create. In fact, the Europe of Mr. Bingham's book doesn't seem to be any real improvement on the type of world that might exist a generation from now if Hitler wins his war and if the enmities bred by the conflict have a chance to be forgotten (the second condition being less likely than the

[1] A Federation for Western Europe, by W. I. Jennings. New York: The Macmillan Company. 219 pages. $2.50.

[2] The United States of Europe, by Alfred M. Bingham. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 336 pages. $2.50.

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first). For if industrial management, the investor, labor and the consumer are all to be organized in "fronts" of the scope and power which Mr. Bingham envisages, surely the need will emerge for a coördinating agency to prevent "chiseling" on the part of any one "front." The NRA required Hugh Johnson—and if it had gone on it would have required an industrial police force and an industrial court of last resort. Personally, I prefer the sloppy, untidy, contentious world where the ultimate decisions are left to a political Congress, with labor keeping the right to strike, with the consumer having to fight for low prices and unadulterated goods, and with the "people" arrayed perennially against the "interests." The TNEC (or trust-whacking) is preferable to the NRA (or trust-coördination) for spiritual reasons, even though "efficiency" gets it in the neck.

Mr. Bingham believes (inferentially) in over-all planning; this reviewer believes in partial planning, or planning that is designed to free men, including business men, from the necessities of top-down control. The trouble, as I see it, with Mr. Bingham's blueprint for a cartel-based Europe is its un-Brandeisian quality; it denies to the average man the chance—or the illusion—of a daily exercise of the will. Democracy would still exist in Mr. Bingham's Europe. But I fear that it would be a sterile sort of democracy—an eternal round of plebiscites on the proposals put forward by experts. The race would breed two predominant types: samurai and yes-men, each a little less than human. In saying as much I may be writing myself down as a "reactionary" liberal, to use Rexford Tugwell's description. But the compulsion to be "on the side of history" may be the supreme opportunism. I side with John T. Flynn on the subject of the NRA.

In objecting to Mr. Bingham's faith in the cartel, I do not mean to imply that I reject the whole of Mr. Bingham's book. Mr. Bingham is tough-minded in his realization that many experiments, some destined to be futile, some capable of growth, will have to be made before Europe can be federated. The Alexander Hamilton who explained in the Federalist all the reasons why "collective security" under divided sovereignty is an illusion might be caustic at the expense of some of Mr. Bingham's "halfway house" definitions of sovereignty. But Articles of Confederation periods must precede Federalist periods merely as a requirement of intellectual digestion. In proposing a halfway federalism that would create the need and the desire for full federalism, Mr. Bingham may be doing more practical good than Professor Jennings, who states the case in his book for federalism full-blown.

JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

Either Side of the Proscenium

Round-hi! The mask of Comedy wears here
Split grin, wide as a dangling pear
Is heavy; and like the weighty curve of the pear
Comedy, ranked with those who also serve,
Wider still gapes her mouth to cry:
"Nothing! Nothing! Hurrah for Empty!"

"Fill her mouth with dust," remarks Tragedy,
"Man's dust, of which there is plenty everywhere."

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Doctors Are Rare Poets

As I Remember Him: The Biography of R. S., by Hans Zinsser. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 452 pages. $2.75.

THE BOOK is a biography of an attitude. It is the summary of the liberal, scientific and tragic outlook that may be dated in the histories as *fl. circa* 1900. Dr. Zinsser has written his book objectively. The figure of "R. S." is seen whole in his liberalism, through his papers and long conversations, his wish to write poetry, his drinking, his work on typhus, cholera and syphilis. The study of the man is not less objective because he happens to be the author.

Dr. Zinsser has employed the useful and wholly endearing device of writing his autobiography disguised transparently as the collected papers of a near friend "without whose constant coöperation and criticism this book could not have been written." He has, he says, cut what he felt was wordy, explained and touched up the German-American background when it became necessary, scolded and coaxed the material out—and written in a suitable death and summary. The distance between the writer and his subject, which is kept throughout, is precisely the distance needed to ensure a standard of honesty and intimacy at one remove.

"As I Remember Him" closes some of the gap since Henry Adams, although it is set at a level which excludes both the profundities and the cynicisms of the "Education." The lifetime of R. S. bridges "the transition from horses to gasoline, from gaslight to electric bulbs, from Emerson and Longfellow to T. S. Eliot and Joyce, from stock companies to the movies and the radio, etc., etc.—in short, from Victoria to Mrs. Windsor." Its anecdotes are rich with affection and the continual humor of a man who is never done with learning. Its balance is that of its hero, who set out to become a poet and, realizing his inadequacy there, became absorbed in medicine and lived to become a brilliant bacteriologist and teacher. The flow of pointed, hilarious stories—of life in Boston and France, China and Africa, Mexico, Serbia, the Panhandle and Japan—is background detail for his real interests: human conditions and human beings. Dr. Zinsser's tolerance breaks down at three subjects—war correspondents (old style), Alexis Carrel and Russia. It flares up into sustained passion about "the Girondin attitude," an aristocracy of education and an "adequate plenty combined with a dignified degree of personal liberty." There is a brilliant account of the activities of a New York medical student. I have judged the treatment of diseases I do not know first-hand from the references to typhoid, which are graphic and suggestive. One of the most illuminating passages tells the story of the meeting of R. S. and Hart Crane on the boat to Mexico, and if you look at Crane's prose-poem, "Havana Rose," you will find this comment on "R. S.":

> Poets may not be doctors, but doctors are rare poets. . . .
>
> And during the wait over dinner at La Diana, the Doctor had said—who was American also—"You cannot heed the negative, so might go on to undeserved doom . . . must therefore loose yourself within a pattern's mastery that you can conceive, that you can yield to—by which also you win and gain mastery and happiness which is your own from birth."

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That advice to Crane is of the caliber of the best of "As I Remember Him"—direct with the surgeon's sureness, and fed by the early poet. Today's headlines also mourn R. S., who loved Paris, who remembered that in *"France la Doulce"* there were no Fascists or Communists, only anti-Fascists and anti-Communists. Here is a man who could be at home in an army epidemic—who went eagerly to Russia in a sanitary period which he compared to that of the Thirty Years War—and in the pages of The Atlantic Monthly.

The Book of the Month Club has made this their July selection. It will be read widely by people who will laugh at the stories, and agree with many of the decisions, and be glad to know the man whose portrait is here. R. S. is dead. He died sharing the Adams tragedy, knowing scientifically how far scientific education had outrun human capacity and the other parts of culture; and how far it was being misused. It is Dr. Zinsser who has buried R. S. before he could see the fall of Paris. We know, and Dr. Zinsser knows, how fitly the timing fell. In this book, imaginative, warm, widely concerned, the liberal attitude—the attitude of a period that died one death this month—is the hero, the villain, the speaker of the epilogue and the one who rings the curtain down.

MURIEL RUKEYSER

Old, Old Acadia

Quietly My Captain Waits, by Evelyn Eaton. New York: Harper and Brothers. 375 pages. $2.50.

BOUGHT BY HOLLYWOOD while still in manuscript (a $40,000 beauty) this is one of the novels that a resourceful director could shoot from the cuff while slowly turning the pages, a love story with plenty of sentiment and melodrama, worked out against a rigged-up historical background and conveniently broken up into nearly a hundred brief chapters, each one building to a neat dissolve in the last paragraph.

The time is 1691-1711; the place Port Royal, now Annapolis Royal, a strategic Acadian post in what was then called New France. The story is that of Mme. de Freneuse, twice married and the mother of five children; after a lapse of seven years, she takes up her girlhood love affair with a personable naval officer, now captain of the French fleet in Canada. There are difficulties. Captain de Bonaventure is himself married and a father, although the wife and children are in the old country. The more immediate handicaps are Madame's husband, the fact that she lives on a remote seigneury and the added complication that the captain's nephew from France (who has been invited to live with the family) falls violently in love with her.

An Indian massacre takes care of M. de Freneuse, the captain's nephew temporarily becomes a renegade, the children are packed off to a convent, and Madame lives idyllically and scandalously with the captain for a few years (gossip, intrigue and jealousy being encountered and loved down). At the end, after the siege and the English-Iroquois victory, the captain is dead and Madame stands in midwinter on the shore of the Bay of Fundy saying, "I am not alone. I have his son."

MAX GISSEN

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THIS 363-page book, just published for the Institute for Propaganda Analysis by Yale University Press, deals with the tremendous propaganda war in which the stakes are America's intervention in, or isolation from, Europe's stupendous conflict. The authors are, Harold Lavine, Editorial Director of the Institute, and James Wechsler, of New York's new newspaper, "PM."

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What the Experts Say

Public Policy: A Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration, edited by Carl J. Friedrich and Edward S. Mason. Cambridge: The Harvard University Press. 405 pages. $3.50.

HERE FOR A CHANGE is good news from Harvard. Make no mistake; it was no routine training school for civil-service candidates that was established under Mr. Lucius Littauer's gift three years ago. Instead Harvard has attempted to fill a more pressing need. Under a separate faculty a coöperative research center has been set up where fellows and consultants recruited from the government service as well as advanced graduate students and members of the faculty from other parts of the university may join in the exploration of the alternatives of public policy. The present volume, consisting of six essays contributed by members of the Harvard faculty and five by consultants and fellows, provides outsiders with their first opportunity to judge the character and significance of the work being done in the school's research seminars.

The impact of administrative necessity on the theoretical training of the writers is apparent in many of the essays. Close contact with problems as they are confronted by men on the firing line in Washington breaks down neat academic categories. The business cycle intrudes into the field of monopolistic competition. Economists become entangled in the implications of pressure-group politics. Above all, experience emphasizes the deficiencies of existing theory. Professor Wallace, a participant in the Price Policy seminar, puts it bluntly: "There exists at present no body of knowledge adequate to support a comprehensive public policy of *any* sort toward industrial markets." Recognition of this situation is an essential prerequisite to the elaboration of a more satisfactory theoretical basis for the definition of public questions. The attendance of government experts makes the seminars inhospitable to the usual academic escapism. Mr. Wallace, for instance, seems well aware that to await more certain knowledge is to counsel inaction. Nevertheless, the essays which touch directly on contentious issues are consistently cautious, tentative and exploratory.

In their new surroundings, unfortunately, the editors of the yearbook and their contributors have not quite sloughed off their professorial habits. Before their next issue they would do well to ponder the difference between policy and history. History is dead policy. The study of policy is not the same thing as the study of even the most recent history. For historical experience at best plays only an ancillary role in current decision. Policy is oriented to the future. The prudent decision of public issues presupposes extensive exercises in social strategy, in short, the careful planning and criticism of alternative courses of action. Neglect of this aspect of the title leaves the reader with the unhappy impression of having read all around the subject without ever getting to the point.

The scientific scrutiny of policy is a new thing, hardly as yet even in its formative stage. It would be grossly unfair to the contributions assembled here to hold them to standards which remain unformulated. Between Friedrich's thoughtful discussion of administrative responsibility at the beginning and Watkins' analysis of the conditions necessary to ensure the constitutionality of emergency dictatorship at the end of the book, the reader will find excellent studies of many topics concerning the public control of the economic system. In particular, Jaszi's examination of the special circumstances surrounding the British boom which preceded rearmament should give pause to anyone who lightly advocates budget balancing as a road to recovery for us.

Another matter to which the editors should give their attention is the *public* aspect of their venture. Today the issues of public policy frequently turn on what are essentially technical considerations. The difficulty of the experts' presentation often reduces public discussion to a headline battle of prejudice and propaganda. In the future it is to be hoped that the editors will recognize their responsibility for public enlightenment. The high quality of this first volume, however, will justify the continuation of the yearbook even if only specialists will read it. JOHN DE WITT NORTON

The Blood's Latitudes

Homeward to America, by John Ciardi. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 62 pages. $1.50.

JOHN CIARDI's first book of poems has come up through strenuous competition. Most of the poems here are from the manuscript which received the 1939 Hopwood Poetry Award of $1,200 at the University of Michigan. The judges of the contest were Horace Gregory, Louise Bogan and David McCord; this book is testimony to their acumen.

The poems have a youthful ring which it is pleasant to come upon, and it is a tone not obscured by echoes. That Ciardi seems fresher than most poets is probably due to the fact that he is content with getting a scene down on paper, sometimes sprawlingly, but with care for the truth of it. He is not yet concerned to any great extent with interpretations: "We have invented nothing," he writes, "when we speak/ It is Time's journalism only: we are reporting merely."

It is an immediate, American scene that Ciardi is reporting. He writes of the "Night Freight, Michigan" with its load of tires and refrigerators and hobos. He writes of the barnyards of the west piled high with rusted iron, and above the air mail droning toward the Pacific. But his is a scene which is bounded also by the "longitudes of the mind/ And the blood's latitudes" and extends as far as Madrid and Barcelona. In his "Reply to S. K." he writes:

> Outside the house and off beyond that noon
> Spain sent disaster smoking toward the sun.

The "bombs shaped like tears" are as immediate as the boy and girl in the Michigan summer night. And in "To a Young American the Day After the Fall of Barcelona," he leaves his survey of the scene to counsel:

> Throw away your little coin
> Of childhood, boy, go down, go down
> With whetted wits and treachery
> And all resource of infamy
> Against the enemy known.

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A Reader's List

General

WESTWARD FROM VINLAND, by Hjalmar R. Holand (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, $3). The Kensington Stone, with its runic inscription, was found fifty years ago in Minnesota. Professor Holand, after a quarter-century of research, produces impressive evidence to show that it is the authentic record of a Scandinavian expedition sent in 1362 to find out what had become of the colonists in West Greenland. He is less successful in proving that he has found the exact spot where ten of the group were scalped by the Indians; and few ethnologists will endorse his theory that the Mandan Indians are of Norse descent.

HISTORY OF THE DONNER PARTY, by C. F. McGlashan (Stanford University Press, $3). A reprint of the second (1881) edition, with foreword, notes and a bibliography by the editors. Still the best history of the famous California-bound wagon-train and its privations while snowbound in the Sierras during the winter of 1846.

FOREIGN POLICIES OF HERBERT HOOVER, by William Starr Myers (Scribner's, $2.50). A sober tribute to the cautious foreign policy of the "great humanitarian and sane realist" who remains, even under Professor Myers' sympathetic inspection, a President who never moved swiftly enough in any one direction, whose political faith was compromise. Mr. Myers adds little to the state papers he was permitted to examine.

Fiction

DOCTOR DOGBODY'S LEG, by James Norman Hall (Little, Brown, $2.50). Ten tall saltwater yarns of near-Munchausen quality (each time the retired English ship's surgeon tells his taproom cronies how he lost his larboard leg, the story becomes different and more fantastic) set in a time when there was no doubt at all that His Majesty's Navy ruled the waves. The eighteenth-century flavor is a little forced; otherwise this is passable fun.

THE MUSCOVITES, by Creighton Scott (Scribner's, $2.50). About Russia just before and after the Revolution. The plot itself needn't greatly concern you; the rest is a splendid travelogue, full of the panic and excitement and unexpected humor of the period, and minus most of the ideologies. Don't miss Ivan's fantastic railway journey, or the chapter in which he gets out of military conscription.

HAPPY VALLEY, by Patrick White (Viking, $2.50). A novel of life in a Godforsaken Australian village, drab and realistic in its character studies and presenting a memorable picture of colonial small-town existence.

HERO AT HOME, by Elizabeth Alexander (Doubleday, Doran, $2). One man and two women, plus the sort of complications that shouldn't surprise anyone who has ever gone in for light summer reading. A pretty triangle in which love beams at first sight, gets clouded over for a while by misunderstandings, and comes out shining again in the final delighted explanations.

EMBER LANE, by Sheila Kaye-Smith (Harpers, $2.50). Brings together a group of English characters as melancholy and decayed as ever stalked a Sussex village in the post-war decades. Hallucinations, murder and suicide are inevitable from the start and are made bearable by cushionings of satire and humor.

News About Books and Magazines

The J. P. Lippincott Company has postponed the closing date of its novel contest from June 30 to December 31, 1940, owing to conditions abroad. The awards, $2,500, four weeks' travel and a four-year guarantee of $2,500 a year, will be given for a novel "in the great romantic tradition" by an unpublished author.

Announcements of two new awards for prose manuscripts have been released. E. P. Dutton and Company, in conjunction with *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, will offer a prize of $2,500 each year for a prose manuscript by a Southern-born writer. Reynal and Hitchcock are giving $2,500 for a non-fiction book-length manuscript by a member of an American college or university staff, with the stipulation that it must be capable of being digested by the intelligent lay reader.

The Alfred A. Knopf literary fellowship, first awarded in 1940, will again be awarded in 1941. Three fellowships of $1,200 each, one in fiction, one in biography and one in history will be given to authors of promise to enable them to complete their work in progress. Further information may be had from Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 501 Madison Avenue, New York.

Contributors

Jonathan Mitchell covers the political scene in articles for various publications.

Fletcher Pratt contributes articles on naval and military affairs to The New York Post, The Saturday Evening Post and the United States Naval Institute Proceedings. Among his books are "The Navy: A History" and "Sea Power and Today's War."

Fritz Sternberg contributes regularly to The Royal Air Force Quarterly in England and The Infantry Journal here.

Howard J. Trueblood is Research Associate in charge of Latin America for the Foreign Policy Association.

C. Hartley Grattan's latest book, "The Deadly Parallel," about the first and second World Wars, was published last winter by Stackpole Sons. His other books include "Why We Fought," a study of America's entry into the World War, and "Preface to Chaos," a study of war in the modern world.

Max Lerner is professor of Political Science at Williams College and author of two books, "It Is Later Than You Think" and "Ideas Are Weapons."

Stanley Ferguson, a former orchestra player, now writes for a weekly paper in Washington.

Edmund Wilson is the author of "Axel's Castle," "The Triple Thinkers" and other books of criticism, poetry, drama, fiction and current history.

John Chamberlain, author of "Farewell to Reform" and "The American Stakes," is an editor of Fortune.

Valentine Ackland, an English poet, is co-author with Sylvia Townsend Warner of a collection of verse, "Whether a Dove or a Seagull."

Muriel Rukeyser, whose latest book of poems, "A Turning Wind," was published last winter by Viking, is now at work on a prose book about Willard Gibbs, the American scientist.

Max Gissen has done social-service work and teaching in the New York City public schools. He was formerly editor of Teachers' Guide.

John De Witt Norton, a student of economics and finance, is now writing a thesis on administrative economics.

Coleman Rosenberger is a student at the University of Virginia, where he edited The Virginia Spectator last year. He has contributed poetry and reviews to Poetry, Voices, Furioso and other magazines.

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